Alternative MKR Compensation Guidelines

Alternative MKR Compensation Guidelines,

by LFW & Aes


We wanted to put out an alternative proposal as we were not fully aligned on the MKR allocations proposed in MIP53. The Working Group felt pressure to put something out quickly and some considered a different approach focusing on domain groupings and revising the initial distributions based on them. Changing our approach in the last couple days would’ve led to the working group missing our deadline to the community of May 10th.

How does this benefit MKR Holders? Why distribute MKR at all?


According to numerous academic studies, companies where at least 30% of the shares are owned by a broad-based group of employees, where all employees have access to ownership, and where the concentration of ownership is limited, are more productive, grow faster, and are less likely to go out of business than their counterparts.

In Jeff Bezos’s first shareholder letter, he shared Amazon’s fundamental management and decision-making philosophy which included the follow regarding ownership:

“We will continue to focus on hiring and retaining versatile and talented employees, and continue to weight their compensation to stock options rather than cash. We know our success will be largely affected by our ability to attract and retain a motivated employee base, each of whom must think like, and therefore must actually be, an owner

To maximize the potential of the DAO, we believe everyone working in a CU should have governance rights. We believe that this will be a net benefit to all MKR Holders over the long-term - even if minted MKR exceeds burnt MKR over the next few years.

The quality of decentralization was what drew many to this project, and is a continued value proposition for the Maker Protocol that should be maintained and nurtured into the future. This value can be increased by spreading MKR more widely among the current and future decentralized workforce.

Our belief is that contributors who believe strongly enough in MakerDAO to be dedicating their working hours to the protocol are more likely to retain the majority of any MKR compensation they earn to use to direct the future of MakerDAO, rather than selling it immediately upon vesting. If this bears out, it means that the majority of MKR compensation is effectively removed from the circulating supply.

This belief has held up with many individuals from the projects history. Many of those whom worked in the Maker Foundation have gone on to continue to work for the DAO, in some part due to the MKR they have retained from their time at the Foundation. Smart, driven and committed individuals like these are a critical asset for the DAO and MKR Compensation is a great way to attract and retain these individuals.

Crypto-native Risk
At a traditional technology startup, the founders and later compensation committees play a large role in determining how much equity, if any, is given to new employees. MakerDAO is in a very unique position with the transition from the centralized foundation winding down by year end to a fully-fledged DAO.

Unlike a traditional startup, fully committing to working on MakerDAO comes with additional risks. It is our opinion that these risks warrant increased MKR allocations:

  • Risks associated with the transition from centralized foundation to DAO
  • Regulatory and compliance risk - do the same laws apply to a DAO as to a traditional company? How would these be applied or enforced? Are individuals potentially liable if they are compensated by the DAO in any way? Even if they are just shitposting?
  • Political risk - countries outright banning cryptocurrencies or stablecoins
  • Smart contract risk
  • Risk of Ethereum not scaling successfully and competitors cloning the Maker Protocol on other blockchains (BSC, SOL, ADA, etc)
  • Risks related to the PSM and over-reliance on stablecoins to maintain the peg
  • Crypto markets have historically had multiyear bear markets followed by short bull markets - it took bitcoin 3.5 years after the peak in late 2013 to reach its prior ATH and 3 years after the most recent peak in late 2017. It’s very possible that any MKR contributors receive could be worth much less than today in a relatively short time period.

Core Components of MKR Compensation Guidelines

1. Domain Approach
These guidelines take a higher level approach than other proposals and focus on domains rather than individual core units. We’ve split core units (existing and potential) into both domains and subdomains and given each a suggested relative MKR amount.

There are four primary domains and these are as follows:

  • Engineering - Technical development and support of the Maker Protocol.
  • Risk - Management of risk in multiple areas.
  • Growth - Encouraging growth of the Maker Protocol and the MakerDAO.
  • Coordination - Maintaining effectiveness of MakerDAO, its core units, and its governance.

We believe that this domain-level approach is more scalable and future-proof than making guidelines for specific core units, and should highlight the inclusivity of the Core Unit Framework and MKR Compensation.

2. Social Leveling
These guidelines propose spreading MKR compensation on a ‘flatter’ basis than most traditional organizations would consider optimal, with the difference between the highest and lowest recommendation being only 3x.

As discussed above, we feel that greater ownership will increase core unit efficiency and increase the decentralization of governance power, both of which are compelling arguments. Additionally, we feel that it is optimal to maintain strong relationships between individual core units given how much their areas of responsibility overlap in the blockchain-industry environment. We feel its important to avoid unecessary stratification of the DAO’s workforce that could impact efficiency, or even cause very real dangers if core unit employees are not aligned with MKR Holders.

3. Multi-phase Guidelines
These guidelines propose a multi-phase, ‘living’ approach to core unit MKR compensation. These guidelines are meant as an initial proposal that can evolve over time, perhaps revised on an annual basis.

The flexibility of modifying these guidelines in the future will ensure that MakerDAO can react to a changing market and industry environment.

4. Vesting Requirements
These guidelines propose a 1 year cliff, and vesting on a quarterly basis lasting for up to 4 years.

We feel that this schedule represents an approximation of the industry standard, and encourages the length of commitment that allows effective transfer of knowledge between personnel.

The more forgiving quarterly vesting intervals ensure that no individual feels ‘handcuffed’ to the DAO for a maximum of 3 months. We want to ensure that the DAO get’s each individual’s best and enthusiastic work - someone marking time to wait out their next cliff will not deliver their best work.

5. Limit to Inequality
These guidelines propose a maximum difference in MKR compensated within a Core Unit of 10x, limiting the extreme level of inequity that is observed in traditional organizations.

We believe that this guideline will help to prevent abuse of Core Unit personnel by Core Unit Facilitators in the long term. Due to the borderless nature of the DAO’s workforce, it will be possible for facilitators to economise greatly by hiring from locations with a lower cost-of-living. This is a key advantage of a borderless workforce. However, there are limits to the extent that this can be ethically pursued which we believe should be recognised by these guidelines.

6. Separation of Concerns
These guidelines propose that applications for Core Unit operating budgets be pursued separately from proposals for Core Unit MKR Compensation.

We believe that this separation of concerns encourages good-faith negotiation from both MKR Holders and proposing Core Units. It helps mitigate the impression that MKR Holders arms are being twisted in order to ensure the services of Core Units, and it gives the Core Units a chance to demonstrate their ability to the DAO prior to requesting MKR Compensation.

Furthermore, this separation allows for the discussion of a Core Units value separately from tangential concerns such as MKR dilution. We believe that this will ensure budgetary and MKR compensation discussions are less intermingled and more focused - hopefully leading to better outcomes.

Initial Compensation Guidelines

Please Note - these MKR values are only to serve as a starting point for discussion and are NOT fixed - there is a massive difference between a team as talented as the '96 Bulls proposing a Core Unit and the '72 Sixers (who only won 11% of their games.)

Compensation guidelines should be flexible enough to accomodate both superstar teams and those with less experience but that have shown potential.

Ultimately, it is up to governance to evaluate each individual proposal on its merits and determine the appropriate MKR compensation.

Domain Suggested Multiplier Average MKR / person / year PE Submission Price 1y High Value 1y Low Value
Engineering - Protocol 1.5 120 270,000 720,000 50,640
Engineering - Oracles 1.2 96 216,000 576,000 40,500
Engineering - Frontend 0.75 60 135,000 360,000 25,300
Engineering - Integrations 0.9 72 162,000 432,000 30,400
Risk - Protocol 1 80 180,000 480,000 33,800
Risk - Real World Finance 1 80 180,000 480,000 33,800
Risk - Legal 1 80 180,000 480,000 33,800
Growth - Business Development 1 80 180,000 480,000 33,800
Growth - Marketing 0.75 60 135,000 360,000 25,300
Growth - Internal 0.9 72 162,000 432,000 30,400
Coordination - Governance 1 80 180,000 480,000 33,800
Coordination - Communications 0.5 40 90,000 240,000 16,900

Rejected Guidelines

Should we set a fixed cap of MKR to be allocated across all Core Units?

We don’t believe this is the best approach, despite some advantages for the following reasons.

  1. We believe it will result in increasing centralization as existing Core Units will not want new Core Units within their domain, as it would mean sharing the MKR allocation. At the least, this is likely to inhibit knowledge sharing and will result in Core Units wanting to absorb new contributors ‘in-house’ rather than encouraging them to create new core units.
  2. We believe it will incentivise Core Units to fight over the fixed amount to be distributed (with all the contention, disagreement and conflict that implies), rather than limiting their arguments for what they believe is fair for themselves. EG: “We should get more of the pie relative to x because we do much more than them” versus “we deserve this much MKR because of x, y and z, awesome things we have done.”
  3. We believe it will be difficult to determine an appropriate annual cap without having full visibility of upcoming Core Units. While this visibility may be possible in the short-to-medium term, it’s unlikely to be possible in the long-term.
  4. We believe an annual cap will restrict governance’s ability to onboard additional Core Units - regardless of how much value they could bring - due to the necessity to keep promises to existing Core Units.

Should we set a MKR cap per Core Unit?

We don’t believe this is optimal. Having a fixed MKR cap per Core Unit would disincentivise facilitators from hiring new contributors if it may impact the amount of MKR recieved by them or their long-standing contributors.

On the other side, a per-person cap does incentivise Core Unit expansion rather than division because it’s easier to join an existing unit than setup a new one. This could lead to larger core units, rather than more core units. However, in this case there are still incentives for enterprising individuals to become facilitators of new core units due to the individually higher rate of MKR compensation they might recieve.

On balance we feel it is better to err on the side of too much expansion than it is to encourage core unit facilitators to keep their employee count low.

Should we just give bonuses in DAI?

While this might seem attractive now, there is no guarantee that we are going to have significant amounts of surplus DAI when we operate in the future. Addtionally, DAI does not provide the same manner of long-term incentive alignment that vested MKR does.

On balance we feel that offering MKR incentives is preferable to offering bonuses only in DAI.

Should we just reduce MKR compensation for all units?

While some may view these guidelines as larger than they would have preferred to see, there are multiple good reasons to offer Core Units higher MKR compensation. These are covered in more detail in the second section of these guidelines, but to summarize:

  • There are significant risks to working for a DAO.
  • The strength of the DAO is the number and committment of those working within it.
  • MakerDAO is still an early-stage project, despite its success thus far - this is reflected in the risks and environment in which the Core Units work.

Should we be concerned about members of the DAO receiving enough to retire / leave employment?

We don’t believe that this is a significant risk in the near or medium term. While it’s possible that this will happen on an exceptional basis, we believe that a majority of those working for the DAO do so for reasons that are not primarily financial, and that these reasons will remain regardless of compensation.

We also believe that ‘retirement’ for this reason is not necessarily a negative outcome for the DAO. Compensation given in MKR encourages on-going commitment to the protocol, and we expect to see some percentage of those leaving formal employment within the DAO to spin up complementary projects, take a more active role in governance or move on to something else that tangentially benefits the Maker Protocol and MKR Holders.

Is protocol alignment only necessary for ‘critical’ core units?

We don’t believe that this is the case. Any core unit employee has opportunities to operate in a manner which negatively impacts the DAO and/or enriches themselves at the expense of the DAO. For this reason alone, we believe alignment is critical for all personnel.

Even aside from this aspect, though, we believe that the benefits in terms of commitment and ownership of the protocol recommend the approach of spreading MKR widely among core unit contributors.

Financial Implications - Scenario Analysis

I’ve built a basic financial model for Governance to assess the financial impact of the MKR compensation under various market and interest rate conditions. I encourage everyone to adjust the inputs to what you feel are reasonable estimates.


Base Case


  • DAI growth moderates but continues and hits an all time high of $6.1B by year end.
  • Interest rates increase modestly over the next couple years and peak at 2.5% in 2024, then decline to 2.25% in 2026.

MKR net income and cash flows grow to $534M and $587M by 2026. MKR compensation peaks in 2024 as the last portion of the initial MKR compensation vests (all MKR compensation in 2024 is worth $234M). Total MKR supply excluding the MKR transferred from the Foundation in 2023 is 931K and decreases to 910K by 2026.

Bear Case


  • DAI growth declines to end the year at $4.65B and falls 50% in 2022 as crypto enters a prolonged bear market
  • Interest rates decrease to 1% and remain there through 2026
  • DAI expense growth is cut to 5% as costs are reined in to align with market conditions

MKR net income and cash flows in 2026 are 53M and $60M respectively. MKR compensation peaks in 2024 at $24.1M and dilution continues but moderates through 2026. Total MKR supply excluding the MKR transferred from the Foundation reaches 940K by 2026 (assumes the DAO uses the Foundation MKR to pay CUs).

Bull Case


  • DAI resumes growth after a tumultuous summer to end the year at $11.09B and momentum continues in 2022 with DAI outstanding reaching $26.61B.
  • Interest rates decrease linearly by 0.25% per year from 4% starting in 2024.

MKR net income and cash flows grow to $7.24B and $7.49B by 2026. MKR compensation peaks in 2024 as the last portion of the initial MKR compensation vests (all MKR compensation in 2024 is worth $1.41B). Total MKR supply excluding the MKR transferred from the Foundation in 2022 is 916K and decreases to 892K by 2026.


I’m still digging through this, and can’t say I agree with all of it. But wow, you two did a great job giving us a detailed, fairly thorough starting point. Wonderful work.

I feel confident that some version that hews closely to the initial draft can gather quite a bit of support.


Aes, really great work on this. I appreciate you stepping up on this important topic. You clearly articulated a ton of great points.

Including the @SES-Core-Unit proposal in the conversation.

Are there any other proposals I’m unaware of?

Just to chime in here before we write up a longer post: after discussing some of the design choices with @Aes a bit more in detail, I personally see the two models as partially the same thing through a different lens, and partially complementary.

There are some discrepancies, but they are very small: for example the 4 years length of the program where we have recommended 3 years; and the 3 month vs 6 month vest after the cliff. I also believe some of the values that are expressed may call for an adjustment of the linear regression parameters in the SES proposal to make it flatter; personally I’m all for that. The question is what the effect will be on our competitiveness in the job market.

The difference between the two models honestly is more about the perspective from which they are approached. They are very compatible in my view.

Now, there are disagreements, not in the plan itself mostly, but in the considerations under “rejected guidelines.” The biggest one is the budget cap. While I recognize the challenges that are mentioned with introducing a cap, I think they may be a bit overstated, and I believe a budget cap is needed for strategic and operational reasons that I can explain in more detail later.

Other than that, this plan adds more insight on the governance side of things, especially as it relates to cost, which is great. The SES description is more useful as a guideline for individual core units, which was our first focus.

One question I have, is if there’s an intention to turn this into a MIP or not.

Despite the original title of the SES plan, we are not planning to propose a MIP as of now. Our plan, like this one, are recommended guidelines made from our own perspective. If there would be a MIP, it should be about the budget cap imo.

As the OP mentions: it’s ultimately up to the core units to propose their comp, and to the voters to accept or not accept them.

Oh, there’s one more disagreement which is about the separation of concerns section, although I suspect than when our incubation program is taken into account, we would also agree.

We have accepted as SES to separate the MKR proposal from our original budget MIP, and this is really bad for both sides. It’s just an essential part of the deal between the team and the DAO that is intentionally left in uncertainty until the point where cancelling the deal would have very harmful consequences both for the DAO and the team. Do you really want a Core Unit to quit after X months because they found out voters don’t feel like ratifying their MKR proposal!? That’s just terrible.

The alternative that we do support and implement, is to have core units go through a trial like our incubation program. The dynamic is then very different; the whole point of the program is that everything can still change, the team has less independence and responsibility during this time, and there’s the expectation that team will spend a lot of time on figuring things out (read: not be very efficient.) But it does not send the message: “we expect you to work as a pro team from day one and we’ll think about whether we’ll compensate you fairly sometime later.”


Apologies, this statement confuses me. Wasn’t your proposals entire thesis that core units should only propose their dai compensation and a formula would determine the corresponding maker compensation? Why would core units continue to request unique maker compensation agreements?

Well… we recommend core units to apply the DAI to MKR formula, and base their MKR comp proposal on that. Because we think it’s a good model that generally matches expectations on both sides.

But it’s a decentralized work environment. If another core unit thinks our method doesn’t make sense, then of course they’re free to propose a different one.

To me, our proposal is mostly a guideline for facilitators about how to organize their CU. While this proposal here is mostly a guideline for MKR voters on what should be considered reasonable.

And they seem quite compatible.


Understood, thank you for the clarification.

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Haha you’re not kidding. The 1996 Bulls went from Champs to Chumps by 2006. Unfortunately some Core Units might not perform as expect. Hard to stay as consistent & hungry as Tom Brady—year over year.

More than likely already being built (or at least trying) but, where there is fear there is the “opportunity” to add & scale.

So true—this also creates accountability and creates a founders mentality. Sort of what happened with the characters of the “PayPal Mafia”

All-in-all TY both for taking time-out to put this together


@Planet_X withdrew MIP53 so there are no other plans to my knowledge.

This is well done.

Forgive me if I missed it, but will the MKR distributed this way be locked from being sold or transferred for a period of time? My view, the companies in which this works good are privately held and can control the transfer of stock, or the stock is distributed and the employee can see it but it hasn’t fully vested and thus cannot be taken and sold for $$. Stock distributed without restriction more than likely ends up in simply diluting all of the other stockholders (that put their savings into it).

Also, the populist streak in me says a contributor either has enough worth and labor involved to be given stock or she/he doesn’t, and as to those that do the stock given (and thus voting rights) is of an equal amount across the board. Whether someone’s job takes more skill or labor should be compensated by DAI, not by being designated more equal than others in voting governance.

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First of all, thank you for putting your time and effort into this. Overall I think it’s fairly elegant and hope that my feedback is taken positively.

An issue I have is that it’s trying to establish a philosophical basis for the distributions. I think taking this approach will fragment and alienate many people who would otherwise support the proposal - personally I don’t agree with most of the philosophical arguments presented. That being said, I don’t have a problem with the overall structure (or any structure based on logic or even philosophy for that matter), because ultimately we’re operating in a free market and labor is an asset that needs to be acquired.

With that context, I think this is a fine way to do things. BUT a budget cap is a total nonnegotiable for me. With a cap in place, we can disregard philosophical differences, logical disagreements, and move forward with a plan that gets people compensated. I would also not vote for the numbers being presented here, although I know that they are just suggestions. When combined with the base salaries from most of the CU budget proposals, the average worker is being paid ~$400k/yr at current MKR prices. Please correct me if my math is off, but this is far too high.


Just to clarify - we recommend up to four years for an incentive plan - I would personally expect the majority of plans to fall within one to three years, but similar to the amount of MKR proposed, it is up to each CU facilitator to propose what they feel is merited and for governance to approve or reject.

Yes these guidelines are intended to be submitted through the MIP process.

Separating DAI and MKR comp was done to allow inexperienced teams that governance would fund on a ‘trial’ basis to get their feet wet working in the DAO and start showing the value they provide before requesting MKR comp on day 1. I believe separating them is beneficial to the DAO. If you go back to the PE proposal thread you can see how contentious keeping them together can be, and that’s for the most critical Core Unit in the MakerDAO ecosystem.

Yes the MKR compensation will act like RSUs with a one year cliff and vesting quarterly thereafter. It will not be accessible prior to vesting.

Also, the populist streak in me says a contributor either has enough worth and labor involved to be given stock or she/he doesn’t, and as to those that do the stock given (and thus voting rights) is of an equal amount across the board. Whether someone’s job takes more skill or labor should be compensated by DAI, not by being designated more equal than others in voting governance.

I agree to an extent which is why we included a social leveling component - but the market demand for some skills are much higher than others and we believe should be reflected in the MKR compensation.

What philosophical arguments are you opposed to? Please be specific otherwise it’s difficult to discuss and come to a resolution.

A budget cap has been suggested by multiple members of the DAO but I haven’t seen a single person suggest an amount. If you believe something is nonnegotiable then propose an amount to cap it at, either in percent or absolute terms.

I will note that under the base assumptions, the max dilution across all years is 1.1% which assumes a pretty aggressive growth and re-investment in human capital strategy which is lower than what Amazon’s was last year at 1.4%. If one of the most mature and successful businesses in the world is diluting more than MakerDAO and still finds a need to issue share-based compensation to attract and retain talent then I don’t see why the DAO shouldn’t. Look at the dilution seen at other tech stocks last year - Uber (8%), Lyft (7%), Tesla (14%), Shopify (8.5%), Square (15%). I could go on and on.

This brings me to my next point regarding a budget cap. What happens if we set a budget cap and hit that number, then a top tier Core Unit is proposed but requires MKR comp to join the DAO? Do we reject the proposal? Dilution is only a bad thing when the value generated from newly issued shares is lower the amounts issued. IMO we should be fighting to get talent to join the DAO - there is a tremendous opportunity in front of us.

The primary philosophical issue I have is the following:

I am unable to access the link you shared, but I think that empirical evidence (i.e. looking at the top companies on stock indices) would disagree with this. Is this metric a nice to have? Sure. But I don’t think there’s any correlation with becoming one of the most valuable companies in the world. You cited Jeff Bezos, but Amazon would (depending on at what point in time you look at the cap table) only meet this criteria if Jeff Bezos himself and other early Amazon execs are counted as employees.

Additionally Maker has been around for some time now, and I’d bet that the early team and former members of the Foundation collectively make up 30% of the total MKR outstanding. So hasn’t Maker already achieved this goal?

My point is that the section on “Ownership” reads like a philosophical justification for more generous MKR distributions to new Core Units. I agree that Core Units should have aligned incentives, but I don’t agree with the distribution philosophy you’ve outlined.

I don’t agree with this hurdle. We can debate the need for a cap without expressly defining the cap. It’s a concept first, a number second.

Or we lower the compensation for other Core Units. The general point is that we have limited resources, and while I agree that deployment of those resources should be calculated by the anticipated growth it will produce, that is an efficiency calculation. I am not seeing how handing out large amounts of MKR to new Core Units on a perpetual basis is an efficient allocation of capital. Shouldn’t we at least try to get more for less?


Try: Key Studies on Employee Ownership and Corporate Performance | NCEO and Employee Ownership and Corporate Performance | NCEO.

Of course Jeff Bezos and other early executives count. We are not arguing for the CUs of the DAO to receive or for dilution of anywhere near 30% - the point of linking the study is to show there is evidence to show that company’s with flatter compensation structures generally outperform company’s without them. Jeff Bezos says as much in his first shareholder letter which is why I quoted that as well.

To clarify, you disagree that every CU member should receive MKR compensation? Regarding the higher amounts, these are relative values and the absolute values are up to Governance to decide. Each MKR budget proposal should be evaluated on its own merits and this is not intended to be blindly applied to any current or new CU that is proposed.

I just don’t see the value of setting a cap and no one has made any serious efforts to articulate or campaign for one. As MKR budgets are formally approved everyone can leverage the model I provided to understand the financial impact. I will be updating for the DAO as well so the amounts that are approved will be tracked.

So you want to retroactively remove MKR compensation that’s been approved if we reach the cap? So if we’re approaching the cap and a high value team comes along, you would say to the engineering team, “Sorry but we have to take some of your MKR away to fund this new CU”? Or are you saying you would take from the rest of the CUs pro-rata?

Again I will reiterate:

Some core units are actually receiving packages totalling over 500k at current maker price. This is my core issue with the proposal. The core teams who stand to benefit from the proposal the most argue that there is risk in working for maker and therefore they deserve to be highly compensated. They then site top developers at faang companies earning 700k packages however fail to factor in that those high earners are typically managing 150+ developers.

Fundamentally, I disagree with the notion that each member of a core unit needs to be this highly compensated simply because working for the DAO is risky. It is no more risky then any other traditional high paying job where performance is expected.


Which proposal? As mentioned none of these amounts are intended to be fixed values and even differ from MKR compensation that’s already been approved (see PE). I would encourage any member of the DAO to make their opinion heard as each existing or prospective CU submit their own MKR budget proposals.

Each CU will be different and Governance can decide what appropriate compensation is for each one based on the team’s experience, mandate, market value, and whatever else they consider important.

It’s not that I agree or disagree, it’s that I don’t care. I want to get the best teams and individuals for the lowest price.

But the fundamental problem is that there’s no real negotiation. A CU submits an application and has to guess what MKR holders will be okay with. This leaves them with the binary outcome of accepted or rejected, which I actually think is fine. The problem is that a framework creates expectations and the approval by MKR holders of a framework creates an even deeper expectation that that framework will be followed blindly. We either need a budget cap, or a CU that handles compensation negotiations.

Because again this isn’t good negotiating practice. Anyone campaigning for a budget cap will be going against the political will of all of the core units. A true campaign can’t be effective until there’s agreement that a cap should exist, in my opinion.

Why commit to a specific path? If a high value team comes along, and there’s a fixed amount of MKR to go around, let the MKR holders decide where to take it from. They definitely should not break any promises they’ve made as that would compromise governance itself, so the engineering team would not have to worry given the long term commitment MKR holders have already made. Would I make further long term commitments as a MKR holder? Only with a cap. That way when that high value team comes along, their value can be expressed by us having to raise the cap to accommodate them.