Black Thursday Response Thread

This above is one of the best things I have seen. I love the idea people can do this from the web but honestly I think a better way is to pool and split earnings as overall costs on this operation to all parties can be kept low.

I think 85% might be a bit aggressive and I would target 75% honestly but even so I would still supply funds.

I will add as a response to LFW post on executive changes.

I agree with other comments the auction changes 50-500 seems pretty extreme as well as the time increases. What I wonder is if we can get a sizable pool up and running on the normal auctions. Maybe a double of everything 50-100, time from 10min to 30min vs. 500ETH and hours or a day until a working keeper pool can be set up and operational. Then at least we will know the size of our liquidity provider of last resort.

I also would like to see the SCD DC go to $20M vs. 25M Everything else looks perfect.

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Is it possible for us to quote the flip/flop auction lot sizes in DAI instead of ETH?

If keeper returns are measured in ETH, they may not be able to compete on the gas market with trades measured in USD during downturns.


@MakerMan got it. Thank you for the valuable feedback, and handling many questions from the community this afternoon on the Maker Community Call! Would love to meet you one day in person!

Once we plug the leaks by a) introducing improvements to the Collateral Auctions b) onboarding more Keepers, lets figure out how MakerDAO could emerge from the crisis stronger than we were just a week ago.

Moving forward, lessons we all learned today are highly important when it comes to considering new collateral applications to MCD.

Specifically, I would like to bring forward four recommendations:

1. Encourage low LTVs for new collaterals during early days of such collaterals in MCD - Even when collateral value is not as volatile.

Where does this recommendation come from? During the last 9 months I had an opportunity to prototype risk model, calculate stability fee, LTV, debt ceiling (as an independent risk team) in pilots of a new collateral candidate (accounts receivables aka invoices). We were successful at originating real-world loans to trucking companies using DAI using their invoices as collateral (privately sourced DAI deployed to trucking companies who pledged off-chain collateral and borrowed DAI from a legal entity, just without MCD). Based on this experience in finding a product/market fit for MCD in traditional capital markets, I believe we should encourage new collaterals not to attempt replacing most commong legacy financial lending products (which often have very high LTVs). Instead, we should encourage new collateral applications (most of which are in the originating business) - to focus on a “low LTV product-market fit” - a niche in the respective lending markets where borrowers are comfortable pledging said collateral and borrow DAI from MCD at MUCH lower LTV ( such as home lines of credit - i.e. 50% to 70%) and not lending products with high LTV (such as mortgage loans at 80% or 95% LTV).

Example #1: Accounts payable collaterals (invoices of businesses). These guys will argue that 90% LTV IS safe because invoice factoring companies offer 98% LTV (they buy invoices outright). We must argue and encourage such applications to find a niche in the market where borrowers are OK to borrow at 50% LTV.

Example #2: Real estate collateral - we must encourage collaterals to find borrowers who want a “line of credit” type of product (who are OK with low LTV product) instead of a “mortgage” type of borrowers (these folks expect 85% or even 95% LTV product).

2. Define what a “Minimum Viable Keepers” market should be before we allow them into MCD. For example, make sure new collaterals have at least 3-5 Keepers specializing in, and native to this collateral (for example Keepers who understand the collateral, or enough “off-chain auction” participants collection agencies specializing in buying invoices,

3. Conservative debt ceiling allocations. Start with small debt ceiling, and only increase debt ceiling with growth of # of Keepers and history of participation in auctions.

4. Custom Auction Parameters for each collateral. Adjust parameters through governance based on risk/size/liquidity. Think custom Collateral Auction parameters for each collateral (for example:
4.1 liquidation penalty of 10% for real estate, 15% for account receivables, 20% for BAT, 25% for RenBTC

4.2 Consider activation of collateral-specific lot size

4.3 Consider activation of collateral-specific delays

4.4 Consider activation of DYNAMIC liquidation penalty. Liquidation penalty does not have to be static. It could be adjusted according to the risk this LTV and this collateral brings to the MCD system. For example, we can tie liquidation penalty to a bonding curve LTV (for example 50% LTV for collateral X = 10% liquidation penalty, 70$ LTV for the same collateral X = 20% liquidation penalty).

I hope that community considers recommendations above with the goal to reduce probability of Collateral Auction collapses in the future.


Yes. Let’s plug the leak first, but we should also make this right for vault holders. Even if it takes a few months to create a solution, we should announce a plan to do so within the next couple of weeks. It’s imperative for the ecosystem that all participants (the DAO, Keepers, and Vault owners) have their incentives aligned.


2. Define what a “Minimum Viable Keepers” market should be before we allow them into MCD. For example, make sure new collaterals have at least 3-5 Keepers specializing in, and native to this collateral (for example Keepers who understand the collateral, or enough “off-chain auction” participants collection agencies specializing in buying invoices,

I suppose it depends upon the collateral type, but for token based items, I’d vote that we have a readily accessible interface for interacting with the auctions. For example, for ETH-DAI, there should be a website I can go to that lists current auctions that I can bid on in my web browser with something like metamask. Otherwise your liquidity hinges on as few as 3 keepers actually being online, running the software, etc.


As the community signalled earlier in the thread that it would like opportunity to vote on this executive early, the proposal is now live in the portal:

Please review the contents carefully and make your voice heard.

I’d like to personally thank all the community members who joined us in this thread and in what was possibly the longest governance call in the history of crypto. The level of commitment and the depth of thought that has been brought to bear during this downturn has been truly inspiring.


We can also run some keepers at Bidali.

Definitely some. ~$65k at today’s price.

I think most of the OP is great. The one potential issue with just lengthening the TTL is I’m not sure it will entirely solve the problem. You may not end up with 0 bids (which is great) but if you look at typical user auction behaviour, people tend to wait until near the end of the auction to place their actual bid. The issue here will be the same, the user with the fastest bids will win and may in fact enable anyone that colludes with a miner to be able to “out-bid” competitors as disproportionate amount of time by prioritizing certain transactions.

Maybe I’m too far in the weeds here, but this thought popped into my head while reading the blog post.

The other thing that I think is a major issue that doesn’t seem to be addressed is how the pricing oracle was able to be so far off the other market rates such that an individual was essentially able to front-run the on-chain activity. Any thoughts on improvement there? I’m not sure how that price feed is created.

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Would it be maybe possible + a good idea to allow Keepers to cancel bids? This way, committing to a price during high volatility could be easier for Keepers, giving them a way out if the price of the assets they are auctioning turns against them after their initial bid.

This could create so pretty intense avenues for griefing. I’m not sure the tradeoff is worth it.

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Gah, another 1.5 million lost overnight?

Flip auction TTL: 10 minutes => 6 hours
Flip auction maximum duration: 3 days => 6 hours

Setting the TAU equal to TTL makes a lot of sense and resolves most of the problems that come with just increasing the TTL (which was the plan a few hours ago), so good call!

However, I can still see some issues that should be addressed:

  • Make it clear to CDP owners that the liquidation penalty can be as high as 33%. And that it’s most likely considerably higher than 13% during a crash like yesterday.

  • Increase the Surplus Buffer: If the value of the collateral falls more than 33% during the 6 hours, the debt will increase, even if keepers pay close to market rates.
    Also, it is likely that bids will only happen in the last few minutes of the auction: Maybe a -25% bid 10min before auction end with some keepers trying to get a bid in at -5% in the last seconds of the auction. If the gas price spikes, the -25% could end up winning, further increasing the debt.

It might be helpful to show the number of distinct keepers on the website. By distinct, I mean the weighted average number of bids per auction.

Yeah, we owe them as least some proportion of the assets that were lost.

Yeah, I’m in favor. The surplus buffer is DAI that we’re not paying the DSR on. So I’d like to see all those MKR holders who are clamoring to lower the DSR (away from DSR=SF) to instead clamor to increase the surplus buffer.

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Lowering the TAU seems good.

Another reason for delaying the mkr auction is that it gives the people interested time to accumulate the 5m DAI.

Its in makers best interest if they’re able to accumulate closer to the peg.

I’ve been trying to dive into some of the details a bit more. So from a high level view I think the consensus is that:

1: Cryptos started tanking and people wanted to sell
2: This causes network congestion, increasing the gas cost and transaction backlog
3: Keepers didn’t issue transactions with sufficiently high gas price
4: Only one (or a few?) aggressive keeper was bidding zero, which sufficiently high gas price…

But then looking at the docs, on, I find:

“Once the auction begins, the first bidder can bid any amount of Dai to aquire the collateral amount ( lot ). Other bidders can raise that bid offering more Dai for the same collateral amount ( lot ) until there is a bid that covers the outstanding debt.”

This part I don’t get. If we’re saying there was one aggressive keeper that bid zero, at what point did this become a bid that covers the outstanding debt?

Next in the docs: “If and when there is a bid that covers the outstanding debt, the auction will turn into a reverse auction, where a bidder bids on accepting smaller parts of the collateral for the fixed amount of Dai that covers the outstanding debt.”

From the discussion yesterday I didn’t get the impression that there was any such process in place?

So dai auctions as per my understanding work in 2 phases the tend phase and the dent. First there is the kick phase this is where auction participants keep offering dai for the lot being auctioned. This will continue until the bid >= something called the tab. Tab is the amount of dai we are hoping to receive in that auction. Once the tab is covered the auction moves into the dent phase. In this phase participants compete by stating the smallest lot that they would accept for the amount of dai being offered.

My impression/understanding is that the auction just never entered the dent phase (i.e reverse auction) because the was not enough dai bid to cover the tab. I guess it is important to note that covering the tab is in no way guaranteed and it is a perfectly valid outcome for an auction to end without ever reaching the dent phase.

Not sure who is the best person to ask this question to, so I’ll just ping @LongForWisdom. I know that the executive vote was passed this morning, but many of those values were based off of last weeks poll options. I.E the 4% SF. Does it make sense to put out a new poll today for some of the monetary policy values such as DSR and DSR spread and setting that poll to end say monday?

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Not sure if this has already been brought up, but has anyone considered having an auction reset (or some other special action, e.g. extending the auction time) if the final price is >x% slippage from the current COLLATERAL/USD price feed?