I am moving towards a perspective which views the various domains of Maker as networks rather than specific teams.
My purpose in doing so is for continued domain autonomy (autonomy as in resilience and ability to independently adjust) in task completion/coordination/incentivisation as well as limiting mkr voter exhaustion by keeping votes down to the critical aspects of domain work (budget and performance). In this perspective, MKR governance elects “Domain Facilitators” rather than “domain teams and/or EPCs” who will be responsible for communicating goals/expectations, negotiating budgets, publicizing reports/updates and organizing workers within their domain. I hypothesize that striving towards those patterns will increase the bandwidth of each group thus Maker collectively. Over time that role would naturally evolve into groups of facilitators or other alternatives to handle increased complexity.
Each domain requires different sorts of expertise, which implies that different modes of compensation and coordination will be better utilized than one overarching paradigm. Those interested in employing their expertise might be turned off by the additional friction of formally applying to MKR governance and would likely rather coordinate personally. In this facilitator paradigm all the interested worker would need to do is coordinate with the domain facilitator (or someone else within the network connected to the facilitator) to nail down compensation and task details/scope.
As domains develop they will need to create their own governance paradigms to withstand increasing task/resource volume. How to deal with that issue should be up to them (think unions). This is an obvious consequence of creating a Decentralized Autonomous Organization with global ambitions. The various subsystems develop their own complexities and structures; nethertheless they will continue to be influenced by and interact with MKR governance.
“Coordination is not a given in policy networks, but rather, as Bevir has put it, ‘both a driving force of governance and one of its goals’ (2009: 56). This is a matter of what we make of network interaction. Simply put, the more the participants in policy networks are believed to be able to coordinate their own interactions the less we need to worry about coordination as a condition for interaction, and the less we need to worry about ‘network management’, or ‘metagovernance’, and whether and how such practices might involve the state.” (Bevir, The Sage Handbook of Governance)
In my view the MIPs process is hyper focused on metagovernance without engaging with the real difficult questions like how do we compensate/judge work done for the protocol and how do we handle budgets (relates to the recent discussions on how to handle the surplus buffer). Here I just wanted to focus on domains, but I can give my thoughts concerning governance process in Maker in other posts.
How Could this Happen?
This part is easier to adjust and other variations could be more ideal, but basically we could have a Signaling nomination thread where anyone can nominate a Facilitator for each domain. In those signaling threads negotiations would take place, where nominated domain facilitators (who accept and want to fulfill this role) present their perspectives, goals and estimated budgets. The community (anyone who’s interested) could criticize and question these aspects. This might also be a decent mechanism to lure out MKR holders to participate in these negotiations.
Right now the foundation pays these expenses, and currently the protocol does not have a big surplus. Even if the foundation pays the budgets for the immediate future, having public negotiations and awareness of budget is a huge step.
This isn’t a proposal just another way of looking at the situation. Implicit in all this is an understanding of communication/coordination in complex self organizing systems. Parts of this paper are fascinating in that regard: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264440930_Leadership_for_self-organisation_complexity_theory_and_communicative_action
I have been thinking about Rune’s analogy of MKR holders as the political class with voting power (senate, house of reps) and domain workers as the “civil servants” who actually do the work outlined in BIlls and whatnot. This view does not map well to the Maker system as far as I have analyzed it.
Senators are suppose to be public servants, and not have a financial stake in the government (when they do we call it corruption…). MKR holders profit from the protocols growth and have an large financial stake. Lets not delude ourselves of that reality. We should be discussing what is a “fair” distribution of that value between those who commit capital and those who build/maintain/grow the protocol. And why should MKR holders have complete control of the value generated by the protocol? These more fundamental or philosophical question are directly relevant to long term sustainability of the system.