I’ve been thinking about how we can get more people involved in governance and the more I think about it, the more I end up with the conclusion that it needs to be an additional financial incentive on top of the potential price increase from the MKR burn.
Currently anyone who just owns MKR benefits from a stable system, governed by the few, by the burning mechanism but it seems clear to me after a year, that that by itself is not enough incentive to get the majority of (small) MKR holders to participate in voting.
So what’s the idea, increase the amount of MKR needed to pay off the stability fee when a CDP get’s closed by a little, like 1% or only burn 99% of the current fee and keep 1%) and instead of burning that 1% like the rest, immediately send it to a random address currently voting for the most recent governance poll (nomatter what option they are voting for).
People will be incentivised to keep up with voting since the faster they are voting for it, the more chance they have to receive 1% MKR of a payed SF. (every payment of a SF would immediately reward a random current voter voting for the most recent governance poll)
Every extra amount of MKR matters to smaller holders so they should be extra motived to participate.
Reduces incentive to delegate your vote (which is a good thing IMO)
Yeah but whales will just spread their MKR over a 1000 addresses to increase their chance of getting extra MKR
Technically they can, but who in their right mind would want to start voting from a 1000 different addresses?! Even assuming it would be possible to automate this in some way, they would still have to pay for gas for a 1000 voting transactions don’t they (? actual question) and I don’t think the amounts of potential MKR “profit” I’m talking about here makes it worth while to do this for anyone already owning more then 1000 MKR. (anyone holding +1000 MKR should already have enough financial incentive from a stable systems burn mechanism)
There would obviously need to be some conditions to reduce the benefit of such “spreading” behavior so I would suggest (just some ideas to start from):
- only addresses voting with +1 MKR have a chance of receiving this “voting fee”.
- if the amount of (1% of the fee) MKR to randomly reward exceeds x.xx MKR, it gets split up and rewarded over multiple random voters (according to a formula to be defined).
Combine this idea with @mrabino1’s idea to have a weighted voting system and I think you will have a lot more smaller voters, who’s vote also actually moves the needle, if only a little.
Can’t wait to hear what loopholes I didn’t think of you greedy bastards