JustinCase Delegate Platform

JustinCase

Key Info

Delegate Address: 0xCdB792c14391F7115Ba77A7Cd27f724fC9eA2091
Forum: @JustinCase
Discord: @JustinCase#2274
Email: [email protected]
Reddit: DAIJustinCase
Your Delegate Video: Meet Your Delegate | Ep. 7 Ft. JustinCase - YouTube

Resides in the UTC+1 time zone.

Core Values

Maintaining obligations – Trust comes from honouring commitments; trust is essential for adoption and use of the protocol.

Growing the profitability of the protocol – Growth is good, but growth must lead to profitability. I favour increasing revenue over reducing costs.

Simplicity – given a choice between a complex and a less complex solution I will favour the less complex one.

Delegate Statement

Summary: I will work towards:

  • Ensuring that a portion of the protocol profits are going towards maintaining a steady burn but recognize that the protocol has other strategic goals as well.
  • Making sure that previously made deals are honoured and that changes, and terminations of deals are communicated well in advance.
  • Enhancing growth of the protocol and adoption in new areas, while growing revenue and profitability.
  • Communicating in a more easily understandable fashion and to try to create enthusiasm for governance among smaller holders of MKR.

Here are examples of me advocating some of these issues, A B C

When I first got into Maker in the fall of 2018 the way it was presented to me was something like this: “This new protocol generates a stablecoin that it lends out and it uses the profits to burn the token and increase its value”. With a lifelong interest in finance and just dipping my toes into crypto, this was a sentence that resonated with me. It presented something different in the cryptosphere. I believe many others have heard a similar pitch and has for a time been somewhat disappointed that a combination of factors has led to long periods of no burn.

As examples I have these two quotes from two different articles about Maker:

“…All accrued fees on MakerDAO are paid in MKR. The protocol purchases MKR off the secondary market and burns it, ensuring proper alignment incentive between MKR token holders. The burning of MKR reduces its supply in circulation through its intentional destruction. It is an effective method for increasing and stabilizing the price of MKR with the increased value given to the holder resembling that of a dividend…” Link

“…Token Burn

“Burnt tokens” have effectively been destroyed, ultimately reducing the total supply of tokens in circulation. Interest accumulated on Maker vaults is paid back in Dai, this Dai is then automatically swapped for MKR and burned. This is the primary economic driver behind the price of MKR tokens. Burning MKR reduces the supply of tokens, putting constant upwards pressure on the price. The more Dai in circulation, the more interest is generated, the stronger the upwards pressure on MKR’s price …” Link

This shows that the perception from the outside is that MKR tokens will be burned. Failing to live up to this expectation is to me a failure to meet obligations. I believe that prolonged periods with no burn is damaging to MakerDAO’s credibility and trust and has caused some retail investors to look to other projects, reducing value for remaining MKR holders.

In order to maintain a healthy burn we must turn a healthy profit as well as keep the protocol safe and stable. As indicated by the portion of MKR in my portfolio I am a believer in the growth potential of Maker. I think there is a potential for capturing a larger market share in the cryptosphere, but I believe there is an even larger potential for growth in Real World Assets (RWA).

Maintaining a burn touches into a broader issue of meeting obligations in general. As we grow larger in RWA, we’re going to have many entities depending on MakerDAO acting in good faith and honouring its obligations. Erratic behaviour will result in us losing trust with other entities and reducing our potential as a partner. My default stance will always be to maintain previous deals, either implicit or explicit. Strong arguments can sway a particular issue or stance but if we need to break off on a previous agreement it will have to be after giving a fair warning ahead of time that we intend to do so, assuming it is not possible to come to a mutually agreeable alternate plan.

I recognize that Maker can have a very high barrier of entry and I will do my very best to try to keep my communication as understandable as possible with as little technical jargon and abbreviations as possible.

Lastly, I’d like to share a little of my background. I’m currently working in business administration with a decade of experience. I hold an MBA with a major in Strategy and a minor in Finance.

I have also had some experience from politics. The key takeaway for me was to more carefully consider the needs of different parties and come up with a workable solution that leaves stakeholders satisfied.

Potential conflicts of interest

I am a holder of MKR and currently it is about half my crypto portfolio. The maker portion is about two years salary. The other half is in ETH.

I hold a diversified portfolio of stocks and funds.

My primary income is not from Maker, nor do I receive any form of compensation outside of MakerDAO for my participation within.

Waiver of liability

I have read and pledge to follow the Recognized Delegate Code of Conduct. As such I will to the best of my ability act in good faith to the best interests of the Maker Protocol. I will maintain communication regarding my stance on the various issues that is voted on.

By delegating to me you acknowledge and agree that JustinCase will not be held liable for any damages caused by my participation in the Maker Protocol or because of any votes cast while acting as a delegate.

16 Likes

Polls ending November 15. 2021

Local Liquidation Limit Adjustments for ETH-A, ETH-B, ETH-C, WBTC-A and WSTETH-A - November 15, 2021
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: This proposal will in my opinion improve our ability to maintain our obligations through lowering the risk of failing to liquidate assets when needed.

Rates Proposal - November 15, 2021
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: This proposal is in essence a question of balancing risk with growth. The carrot is that reducing risk comes with some extra revenue.

Offboard the AAVE-A Vault Type - November 15, 2021
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: Conflicted between profitability and maintaining obligations I landed on the side of profitability. Due to the lack of an entity to communicate with one must assume that stakeholders in this case are “communicating with their assets” and the lack of profitable interest is an indication this collateral type is not needed right now.

Offboard the BAL-A Vault Type - November 15, 2021
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: Conflicted between profitability and maintaining obligations I landed on the side of profitability. Due to the lack of an entity to communicate with one must assume that stakeholders in this case are “communicating with their assets” and the lack of profitable interest is an indication this collateral type is not needed right now.

Offboard the COMP-A Vault Type - November 15, 2021
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: Conflicted between profitability and maintaining obligations I landed on the side of profitability. Due to the lack of an entity to communicate with one must assume that stakeholders in this case are “communicating with their assets” and the lack of profitable interest is an indication this collateral type is not needed right now.

Change of Covenants for P1-DROP (Peoples Company Series 1) - November 15, 2021
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: I can see the concerns regarding the legal structures and the murkiness regarding the risk. However in this case it is not enough for me to overcome my default stance of maintaining obligations. If we want to unwind from the current structure I think we should start a process on that and signal our intentions well in advance. Preferably we should work out a new structure that doesn’t leave our counterparts hanging.

2 Likes

Template - [Executive Proposal] Onboarding WBTC-B, Increasing WBTC-A Stability Fee, Change of Covenants for P1-DROP, Offboarding Collaterals - November 19, 2021.
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: The poll that ended November 15. covers almost all of this executive and I voted yes in the relevant polls. The piece included is adding the WBTC-B vault type. This is a riskier type of vault but has a higher stability fee. It mirrors the existing ETH-B vaults. The likely results of introducing this vault is that some portion of WBTC will flow to this new type of vault. Overall it might increase risk somewhat but it is bundled with a change that will reduce risk in the same vault type. I approve of this change.

1 Like

Polls ending November 22, 2021

Ratification Poll for Adding the Deco Fixed Rate Core Unit (DECO-001)
Voted: Abstain
Reasoning: This is a very interesting proposal introducing a possibility for getting fixed interests in vaults. With this proposal I see some of my principles being in opposition. On the pro side we’re looking at a growth opportunity in capturing value from actors that require fixed rates, we’re getting more predictable income which can serve as insurance for when markets turn, and we open up the potential to other applications being built onto this. On the con side I see this adding more complexity, both on the technical side and for users to relate to. There has also been raised some concerns on the legal side which hasn’t been fully answered. Overall I’m torn enough that I vote abstain.

Ratification Poll for Modify Core Unit Budget, RWF-001 (MIP40c3-SP39)
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: I believe Makers greatest growth potential lies within Real World Finance. The team so far has done great work and I have full confidence they will put the funds to good use.

Ratification Poll for Modify Core Unit Budget, COM-001 (MIP40c3-SP40)
Voted: Yes
Resoning: Hardly controversial this makes some minor changes to the budget, but most importantly extends until then end of the second quarter of 2022.

Ratification Poll for the Immunefi Security Core Unit (IS-001)
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: If we are to maintain our obligations we need to ensure the security and integrity of the protocol. Leaving that to chance seems ill advised.

Ratification Poll for Adding Sidestream Auction Services Core Unit, SAS-001
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: One of our key obligation is making sure the protocol stays collateralized. In order to do so we need to make sure the liquidation auctions are working as intended. This seems to me to be a step in the right direction to make sure we live up to our obligations.

Ratification Poll for Real-World Finance Core Unit MKR Compensation, RWF-001
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: This proposal establishes MKR compensation for the Real World Asset core unit. Having compensation in MKR increases the teams alignment with that of other MKR holders. I believe this is a prudent step and in line with what is done in other core units.

Ratification Poll for Modify Core Unit Budget, MKT-001 (MIP40c3-SP33)
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: This proposal extends the budget of Content Production until the end of the first half of 2022. Having core units comes with the obligation to fund them so this is an easy yes.

Ratification Poll for Supplement to Collateral Onboarding Application (MIP6c3-SP1)
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: This proposal adds a list of further requirements to any onboarding applications for real world assets. As we cross the boundaries from the virtual to the physical there are information needs that needs to be filled. This proposal helps fill that need for information, and is something we should expect anyone wishing to onboard real world collateral to answer.

1 Like

Polls ending November 25. 2021

Add WBTC-C as a new Vault Type
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: This is the complementary vault type to WBTC-B that I discussed in relation to the executive of November 19. WBTC is a less risky vault than WBTC-A and given the volume in those vaults I think it is worth it to provide a less risky alternative. This also helps balance out the increased risks that comes from the WBTC-B vaults. The downside is less revenue generated.

Increase the System Surplus Buffer
Voted:
1. No increase
2. Increse Stability buffer to 90M and the limit by 0.67M/week
3. Increase Stability buffer to 90M and the limit by 1M/Week
Reasoning: This is an issue I feel strongly about and one that is at the center of my delegate platform. I believe that we should strive to maintain some level at burn as long as we run a profit. Ideally we would do this with a set fraction and set fractions going to other purposes. Due to technical limitations we’re right now constrained to burning everything as long as the surplus buffer is full and nothing when it is not. In order to fully evaluate this change it isn’t enough to look at the surplus buffer limit but also other events that contribute to either filling or emptying the surplus buffer. Oracles Core Unit has put in a request to pull 8.7M in expenses. At the current profit levels that would take around a month to build back. Granted there might be mitigating steps taken but that is going to shave off a week or so of this time.If we start increasing the surplus buffer at the same time it’s going to delay the start of the burn by around two more weeks at 1M a week increase. My preference at this time would therefore be no increase until we are back on 60M and then a gradual increase to 90M.

Add a GUSD Peg Stability Module
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: The most important obligation of the protocol is to keep the peg. This gives us another asset that will help maintain it and it diversifies us from other assets all in all a big plus in my book.

Increase the Aave D3M Maximum Debt Ceiling
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: The D3M is a way for us to stabilize the interest of DAI and to capture some of the value from its use outside of MakerDAO. I appreciate the gradual phasing in of this and given that risk as deemed it safe to do so support increasing the debt ceiling. This will also help grow our profitability.

2 Likes

Executive November 26. 2021.

Onboarding New Vault Types, Parameter Changes, and Core Unit Budget Distributions
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: The only proposal in this executive I did not vote “Yes” to was to add the Deco fixed rate core unit. As for the changes to parameters I gave an account of my position in the previous post. All in all I see no reason to not support this executive even though I might have wished it to be slightly different.

4 Likes

Polls ending November 29. 2021

Community Greenlight Poll - MONETALIS (Monetalis Wholesale SME Green Growth Lending)
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: This is a real world asset project that seeks to utilize capital from the protocol to fund loans to small and medium enterprises in the UK to drive green change. This is very much in the direction laid out in the case for green money. It is also a fairly substantial sum that is question. It seems to me this project also carries a potential to scale further. Overall I think this is a compelling case for both growing the profits of the protocol and getting more DAI into circulation.

Community Greenlight Poll - SB-frOGI (SolidBlock Red Frog Digital Coin)
Voted: No
Reasoning: This one took a lot of thinking, but in the end I landed on that I believe it is best for Maker DAO to focus their limited capacity elsewhere at this time. This project is also a real world project asking for funding to real estate projects. In this project there is the added complexity of having another tokenization model to deal with. I don’t see any immediate scaling with this project either. That being said we might find room for this or something similar further down the line.

1 Like

Polls ending 02. December 2021

Increase the Dust Parameter for Most Vault Types
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: This is an unfortunate step because it increases the bar to get access to the majority of our vaults. I fear higher dust limits will limit our growth. We have no control over the prices of gas however and have to take steps to protect the protocol from losses in the event of liquidations. Hopefully we can find solutions that makes these vaults more accessible again in the near future.

Increase the Dust Parameter for ETH-B Vault Type
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: This is also a case of protecting vaults in the event of liquidations due to high gas prices. In this particular case I’m less concerned than with the other vaults as ETH-B represents a more risky vault and I think we should be able to expect more from users of such vaults. Of course ideally we want to find solutions that we don’t have to for these kinds of vaults too.

Use the MakerDAO Treasury to Fund MKR Expenses
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: Part of the draw of the MKR token is the narrative that there is 1.000.000 tokens or less in existence. As long as we have a treasury of them I vastly prefer to draw from this over issuing new ones. Primarily I would not support issuing new MKR at all, but if we are to do it we need to have a long and good discussion about how we are going to go about it. Issuing MKR is burning in reverse and we’ve seen the effects of postponing the burn.

Add GUNIV3DAIUSDC2-A as a new Vault Type
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: It’s always nice to be able to support onboarding of a new vault and watch Maker grow. This goes straight to my principle of wanting to grow profitability. I want to add that in the light of the recent discussions surrounding offboarding of other vaults that by taking this stance we should also be willing to let this vault run for a while to give it a chance to show it’s worth.

One Time Payment to the GovComms CU to Deal with Budget Issues
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: In the field of human endeavours mistakes are going to be made. I believe in correcting honest mistakes with a minimum amount of friction. Hopefully we can learn something from this and avoid similar mistakes in the future. Perhaps this can also help build a case for making a separate accounting CU.

Parameter Changes Proposal - MakerDAO Open Market Committee
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: In my view these changes to parameters are largely based on changing market conditions. Most, if all of them, are tweaks so there shouldn’t be any dramatic effects. I’m happy to see that this will add more revenue and thus profitability to the protocol.

Add CurveLP-stETH-ETH as a new Vault Type
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: Another ETH vault. I predict that staked Ethereum is just going to grow in popularity as we go forward. Making a vault for this asset is prudent and in line with growing the profitability of the protocol. I am a little concerned that we are setting the dust limit too low in light of the proposal of increasing it from 10k to 15k for all similar vault types.

4 Likes

Executive December 6. 2021.

Parameter Changes, Delegate Compensation, Vault Onboarding
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: The parameter changes in this executive is mostly minor rate increases and most likely will help increase the profits of the protocol. We have the unfortunately necessary changes to dust limits. It also contains onboarding of GUNIV3DAIUSDC2-A vault type as well as corrections to the Governance Communication Core Unit and the payout of the delegate compensation. All in all there are some nice changes here.

Polls ending 09. December 2021

Adjust wstETH-A System Parameters
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: The main purpose of this proposal is to increase the debt ceiling of the wstETH-A vault (Staked ETH). Along with this there are some other parameter changes that will allow for faster debt growth and quicker liquidations. It is always nice to see a new vault type gain popularity and given that we do not incur undue risk I happily support these changes. Growth in our vaults leads to growth in our profit.

Adjust MATIC-A System Parameters
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: This proposal is to increase the debt ceiling of the MATIC-A vault. This vault type has survived two recent attempts to offboard it so it is really good to see it gain some traction. I think it also serves as a reminder that we need to have some patience with different vault types as they may not start out profitable. Now that the momentum is positive I think it’s urgent that we allow it to fulfill its potential. We may have gotten off on the wrong foot but right now it seems that we’re heading for a bright future.

Executive December 10. 2021.

Parameter Changes, Switching MKR Vesting Source
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: A fairly small executive this time. I voted yes in all the polls going into this executive so voting yes for the executive is straight forward. The three proposals were:

  • Adjusting wstETH-A System Parameters
  • Adjust MATIC-A System Parameters
  • Use MakerDAO Treasury to Fund MKR Expenses

These can be found on the polls ending on the 02. and 09. of December. I’m particularly happy about the changes to MATIC-A parameters as I see that as a positive change borne from community interaction and turning something of a losing situation into a potential very fruitful cooperation.

4 Likes

Polls ending December 16. 2021

DAI Direct Deposit Module (D3M) Debt Ceiling Targeting
Voted:
1. Neither Indicated Percentage of Real AAVEv2 DAI Supply
2. 25% of Real AAVEv2 DAI Supply
3. 30% of Real AAVEv2 DAI Supply
Reasoning: I believe the D3M modules represents a useful way to provide DAI through third parties, and especially for users who are locked out of participating in Maker Vaults due to dust limits. As such I’m happy to support proposals that increase the amounts we can provide. Unfortunately in this particular case risk recommended keeping the supply to 15-20%. I highly value the expert opinion of risk and would therefore primarily prefer to keep the supply at those levels. That being said, we are in an expansion phase and as such we might have to condone a little elevated risk for some time so I’ll support further increase although at a lower priority.

DAI Direct Deposit Module (D3M) Net Rates Spread
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: This poll is tied to the previous one. The target rate of the D3M module is going to have a direct effect on how much of the debt ceiling we can utilize. The lower the rates the higher the utility. On the flip side, lower rates on the D3M makes it more attractive to borrow through Aave rather directly from Maker Vaults. This reduction in target rate makes it a little more attractive to borrow through Aave but still for the majority of use cases it’s cheaper to use Maker vaults directly. I’m not overly concerned how we put the DAI into circulation because at the end of the day, Maker DAO ends up with the interest from the issue either directly or through the D3M. Overall I expect this to increase DAI supply from current levels.

Recognised Delegate Compensation Trial Performance Modifier
Voted: Abstain
Reasoning: I was asked about delegate compensation in my introduction video and I will restate some of what I said there. In matters of delegate compensation I will as a main rule always abstain. That is because I see it as impossible to hold an unbiased view on the matter as long as I am an acting delegate. My preferred solution to questions of this type to be solved without any involvement of delegates at all.

1 Like

Polls ending December 20. 2021

Community Greenlight Poll - aUST (Anchor TerraUSD)
Voted: No
Reasoning: This is a onboarding request for a new type of collateral. It’s always hard to turn down new potential members of the Maker family but in this case the risk seems too high to warrant an inclusion at this time. Monet-supply made a compelling risk arguement here. Hopefully the issues can be adressed and we can have a future fruitful collaberation.

Community Greenlight Poll - G-UNIv3-DAIUSDP (Gelato UniswapV3 DAI-USDP LP Token)
Voted: Abstain
Reasoning: This is another onboarding application for a collateral type. For this collateral I fear we might be too late to the party and even so I have doubts this will prove profitable. I don’t think it will pose a direct risk to the protocol however so we might try it out but I think our resources are better employed elsewhere. All in all I am therefore abstaining from voting on this particular collateral type. It will be interesting to hear further evaluation from our Core Units on this.

1 Like

Polls ending January 13. 2022

Prioritize Onboarding a Compound DAI Direct Deposit Module (D3M)
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: Compound is another big player in DeFi space. Establishing a D3M with them allows us to capture some revenue from people unwilling or unable to interact with Maker directly. As we continue to add D3Ms we need to be mindful not only of the individual risks posed by each one but the systemic and cumulative risks that goes into the combination of them. On a more positive note I’m excited to see us grow and find new ways to generate revenue.

Raise the Emergency Shutdown Module (ESM) Threshold
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: It is important to maintain an emergency option, but lately we have seen a few actors getting close to being able to trigger this shutdown on their own. It is also a potential malicious attack vector for someone looking to get rid of a bothersome competitor at 7,5% of the value of the protocol. This move increases the threshold to just over 10%. A step in a safer direction without making it impossible to use.

Prioritize DAI Direct Deposit Module (D3M) for Maple Finance
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: Another Direct Deposit Module, this one still differs that it’s not connected to a big established actor in DeFi. The proposal is interesting and even though there are parameters that needs defining I think it’s interesting enough that it warrants looking further into.

Increase the Dust Parameter for Select LP Token Vaults
Voted: Yes
Reasoning: This is more or less housecleaning from the last round of increasing dust limits. While I regret the necessity of doing so it must be done to maintain risk at an acceptable level. Hopefully we will see gas prices come down or our own L2 solutions come online so we can become more accessable.

Proposal - Recover DAI Locked in Optimism Escrow
Voted: No
Reasoning: This is a very reasonable request. In general I think we should make an effort to recover these funds, but I also recognize there are a lot of others who have also lost funds in similar circumstances. Before we do these kinds of recoveries I believe we ought to have a policy in place that describes how we handle these kinds of situations. Such a policy is even being worked on as we speak.

While I recognize the terrible situation the entity that lost those funds to be in, I want to reassure that we are talking about a delay until we can treat everyone fairly. I would also like to underline that a delay is vastly preferable to funds being lost permanently which is a very real possibility in other parts of crypto.

The proposal as written is a one-off solution for a single actor. It will leave us open to accusations that we are catering to a select group, further alienating smaller actors.

2 Likes

Executive January 14. 2022

Recover DAI from Optimism Escrow, Changes to Uniswap LP Vault Debt Floor Parameters, Delegate Compensation
Voted: Yes
Resoning: Another fairly small executive. This one contains the recovery of DAI that I voted “no” to in the polls. Even though I believe that issue should have been resolved different the community has spoken and the votes are overwhelmingly in favor. As such I believe in supporting the community’s chosen course of action and putting it into effect.

1 Like