Mandate: Interim Governance Facilitators

Mandate: Interim Governance Facilitators


The Maker Foundation is proposing a new role, the Interim Governance Facilitator, which is responsible for maintaining the ecosystem supporting the governance process. This role will follow the same ‘interim’ model shared by other foundation teams and is designed to, eventually, be entirely community-driven.

“Interim Governance Facilitators (IGFs) are tasked with ensuring the smooth operation of the governance process. This involves a wide range of activities, anything from general administration to signals gathering to governance scheduling.”

Their key function, though, is encapsulated in the name of the role, facilitation. The primary duty of the Facilitators is to ensure the smooth and efficient running of the distributed and open source governance process at Maker.

As this document represents a formalization of the role he already occupies on behalf of the community, the Foundation is proposing that Richard Brown, Head of Community Development, be the first Interim Governance Facilitator.

After a period of two weeks (set aside for debate and iteration on this framework), the community will have the opportunity to formally choose to accept or reject the proposal in a governance poll.

Acceptance of the proposal will signal the ratification of the new role, the person chosen to exercise its mandate, the associated processes and procedures, and calendar outlined in this document.

Why Do We Need Facilitation?

Because governance is built on ever-shifting sands, the community needs to maintain as much agility as it can without sacrificing velocity. As the decisions that happen in Maker governance can have wide-ranging effects on the entire DeFi ecosystem, we need to keep vigilant against attack (from within and without) and to ensure the process runs smoothly, with as much integrity as possible.

Defining the Role

Like the other major governance-related roles, such as the Interim Risk Team and the Oracle team, the Facilitators are empowered by the community to perform tasks on behalf of the community.

The Foundation is proposing this first iteration of a role that we hope will evolve through guidance provided by the community. After sufficient baseline processes have been established for the Interim Governance Facilitator, and proven successful, additional Governance Facilitators should begin to be onboarded. Working in concert across all major time zones, they will coordinate to ensure global access to the inner workings of Maker governance.

The Interim Facilitator is responsible for gradually bootstrapping the governance processes and procedures necessary to create a more robust governance framework. This will be achieved through a rigorous cycle of policy proposal, feedback gathering, and through regular coordination with other governance stakeholders.

As the following roles, responsibilities, and mandates of the Interim Facilitator become more clearly defined, we look forward to tasks being taken on by additional, community-sourced, Facilitators.

Primary Responsibilities

Ownership and Management of the Official Communications Channels

Governance Facilitators are responsible for ensuring the health and integrity of official communication channels like forums and chat rooms. These tasks include moderation duties, establishing processes and social norms, broadcasting relevant information to the wider world, as well as defending the channels from trolling and Sybil attack.

Defining the Governance ‘Problem Space’

Because Facilitators are empowered by the community as a whole, they cannot be seen to be partisan. They are not empowered to make ‘governance’ decisions, cannot campaign for any specific governance issue, nor should they express opinions about the merits of one polling or voting option over another. They must remain neutral and objective and focus wholly on policy, procedure, and facilitation.

For example: a Facilitator should not suggest to the community that the Stability Fee should be raised or lowered, put forward an alteration to monetary or risk policy, or express an opinion about the desirability of one asset type over another.

The role is one of collating and framing meaningful discussions and soliciting the community for appropriate solutions to issues as they arise. Once those solutions have been debated, the Facilitator is responsible for enacting processes that allow for various levels of consensus to be established and actions to be taken by Maker Token Holders.

For example: a Facilitator would work with the members of the forum to establish rules around the creation of forum polls, appropriate phrasing, poll duration, etc. Once a poll has successfully concluded, the Governance Facilitator would be responsible for communicating that consensus to the wider community and, if required, ensuring that the poll is added to the governance portal for official ratification.


Governance Facilitators are responsible for raising community governance issues back to the Foundation or the third-party ecosystem and ensuring appropriate follow up for the community.

Bootstrapping Process

A governance model that is capable of managing a rapidly developing ecosystem as ours needs to be capable of iterating just as quickly. Governance Facilitators are tasked with nurturing the processes and procedures that will allow the community to rapidly develop in concert with the requirements of governance.

“The users of governance have to shape governance.”

Governance is a hard problem and will continue to be so as the needs of the community grow, and the requirements of the system become increasingly sophisticated. Governance Facilitators will be responsible for preparing the community to iterate rapidly and effectively as we move along the long path to eventual decentralization.

Facilitators will work closely with community members to identify and refine emergent process and workflows that can allow such a large and distributed ‘remote team’ of stakeholders to work together.

Some questions Facilitators will collaborate with the community to answer:

  • Frameworks
    • How do we create canonical reference materials?
    • Where do they live?
  • General Communications
    • How do we effectively broadcast governance issues to the wider community?
    • How do we increase engagement?
  • Polls, Votes, and Signals
    • What are the best practices we should adopt when collecting, filtering, and identifying useful signals?
  • Manage Debate
    • Where does it live? How do we set the tone?
    • When does a debate end?
  • Workflows
    • Where does ‘work’ happen?
    • What pipelines and workflows do we need to formalize?

Framing the Debate

As Facilitators are charged with maintaining and encouraging debate, they need to be vigilant in ensuring that the community adheres to the guidelines outlined in the Scientific Governance and Risk Framework and the Core Foundation Principals.

For example, as a community, we debate the merits of the data being input into the system and the models themselves; opinions or debates about outputs are to be avoided. Unsubstantiated opinions are to be avoided in general.

Problems are more readily solved by reminding the community that they are ultimately in charge of the outputs of the governance process.

Facilitators should:

  • De-emphasize “Why don’t you…?” questions.
  • Emphasize “How can we…?” questions.

Maintaining a healthy debate is critical to the success of any community. It will be one of the most important duties of the Facilitators to ensure that the caliber of discussion remain high, that new members of the community understand the general level of decorum and civility expected by the group, that they have the resources they need to get onboarded quickly, and that the community doesn’t suffer attrition from toxicity, trolling, or apathy.

Establishing Consensus

Once debate has ended, it’s time to identify and encourage consensus-seeking behaviours. This is a pivotal and complicated task.

Some questions the Facilitators will help the community to align on:

  • What does consensus mean?
  • Where do we find it?
  • How much consensus is enough?
  • How do we maximize alignment between the Foundation, the voters, and various unaligned stakeholders?
  • How do we promote consensus-seeking behaviours?
  • How do we deal with contrarians and those unwilling to compromise?
  • What does the ‘least bad option’ look like?
  • Do we seek assent or assume it by looking for dissent instead?

Once the community has established the answers to these questions, the Facilitators are responsible for ensuring they are codified and adhered to. Finally, the Facilitators ensure they are communicated effectively to the wider ecosystem.

Communicating and Scheduling the Roadmap

Among many other things, governance is also a scheduling problem. The actions that Maker Token Holders need to take are dependent on a host of factors. The activities of partners, regulators, market forces, emerging verticals, etc., combine to create a high number of dependencies. Ensuring that there is a reasonably accurate short-term roadmap is the responsibility of the facilitators.

They will achieve this by maintaining public documentation and roadmaps that will provide engaged stakeholders with the information they need to participate with the system and anticipate next steps. Through this constant iteration with the Foundation and the governance ecosystem, they will help the community to shape the future of the DAO.

Coordinating with other Ratified Teams

Governance Facilitators are a ‘meta team’ tasked with facilitating and supporting the actions of the rest of the mandated actors in the governance ecosystem.

It will be key that public and transparent communication channels are set up, which allow the Risk, Oracle, and Governance teams to coordinate.

Handling Emergencies

There will likely be situations where the governance community must respond quickly to new information. It will be the job of the Facilitators to work with the community to establish an emergency voting process to defend the system against unplanned events.

Managing the Governance Facilitators

Although the role has been architected in such a way as to minimise any potential decision-making power, there may come a time when a Facilitator needs to be removed from the role.

Whether for reasons of overstepping of mandates, an inability or unwillingness to enact community-supported initiatives, or a general lack of competence, there must be a system for alerting facilitators to a need for improvement or for replacing them altogether.

Some topics for the community to explore in the coming weeks and months:

  • How does the community formally disagree with a Facilitator?
  • How do we attract and train new Facilitators?
  • Should Governance Facilitators have a term limit?
  • How are they compensated?
  • How do they coordinate with each other?
  • How do we measure Facilitator success?
  • How do we get rid of a bad Facilitator?

A possible solution to consider in the future:

Should we have an ongoing ‘confidence’ poll for each Governance Facilitator? What happens in the event of an attack? What if a whale seeks to replace a person with a more amenable version?

If the ‘abuse of power’ poll ever disappears, then perhaps an ‘Emergency Governance Cycle’ could start. What that looks like is still to be determined.

Collateral Onboarding Priority Poll Process

Facilitators are responsible for ensuring that new collateral types are added to the system by providing a clear path to doing so and effectively communicating the requirements and resources provided by the Risk Teams.

For example, a facilitator would be responsible for shepherding a process like the following, by working closely with the risk teams:

  • Submission: Partners submit their collateral onboarding proposals in the Governance category in the forums. Once the proper due diligence has been completed, and the forum polls have finished with a supportive vote, the collateral type will be added to the next asset priority list poll.

  • Presentation: Through a governance call, an asset will be presented for review before the portal poll. This is not a decision making step; this is part of the Communicating and Scheduling section outlined above.

  • Prioritization: Once an asset has been added to the long term wishlist, it will be sorted through a priority poll. As other top picks are onboarded and removed from the long term wishlist, it should eventually reach the top of the list for inclusion.

  • Pre-Evaluation: All of the mandated and ratified teams then perform their risk evaluation on the assets at the top of the list. After the evaluation processes are complete, the team in question will mark the collateral with a) passed, b) passed but will take longer to finish, or c) rejected.

  • Evaluation: After a collateral asset has been accepted as being viable from all the relevant teams, they can then begin to do the full review and development of the risk construct and onboarding. Once a team has finished doing what they need to do for a given collateral type, they will mark it as “ready to go.”

  • Short Term Wishlist: Once a collateral asset has received the ready-to-go mark from all the relevant teams, it is removed from the long term wishlist and added to the short term wishlist.

  • Queued for Next Governance Cycle: Once a collateral asset is on the short term wishlist, it can be added to General Risk Teams’ Risk constructs and get passed in the following governance cycle.

The Framework, the Calendar, and Next Steps

The process of ratifying a Governance Facilitator, much like a Risk Team, is one of signaling support for a package of roles, responsibilities, principles, and processes. Polling in a new facilitator represents the community’s acceptance of the whole package and includes an associated roadmap and calendar. It is that calendar that allows the community to move ahead with governance.

This will involve a Bootstrapping phase where the community debates and ratifies the roles and processes required to begin the second Governance Cycle phase.

Please note: This roadmap is dependent on a collaborative effort spread amongst the Foundation, our partners, and the governance community. We cannot predict when dependencies may mis-align. It may be periodically updated, items may be added or removed, and the dates may change at any time.


Week of August 12

  • Proposal: Interim Governance Facilitator Mandate
  • Poll: Collateral Asset Priority List

Week of August 19

  • Proposal: Interim Risk Team Mandate

Week of August 26

  • Proposal - DSR Initial Values
  • Poll - Ratify the Governance Facilitator and Interim Risk Team

Week of September 9

  • Proposals - Oracle Team Mandate
  • Proposals - New Oracle Providers
  • Proposals - Oracle Incentive Restructuring

Week of September 16

  • Proposal - MCD Whitepaper
  • Poll - Ratify Oracle Team

Week of September 23

  • Poll - Long-term Collateral Asset Priority List
  • Proposal - The General Risk Model


  • Documentation - MCD Executive Vote Changelog
  • Poll - Initial Oracle Values
  • Poll - Initial DSR Values
  • Executive - Initializing the MCD system prior to launch

Governance cycles, DAO team onboarding, and other proposals

After the Bootstrapping phase of the governance schedule has ended, we will switch to a regular cadence of discussion, debate, signal gathering, review, before the onchain polling and executive process begins.

That onchain process could take many forms, from a simple cycle of proposal, review, voting to a more sophisticated process such as the following:

Week 1: Request for Proposals - The Risk Teams will present the assets they have analysed to the forums for review. In the Governance call, the community will debate the risk construct and surface any contention. The Risk Teams have this week to accept final feedback from the community and to iterate.

This week may also include the introduction of general administrative proposals not related directly to collateral onboarding.

This week could also include an executive vote ratifying the previous month’s governance cycle.

Week 2: Request for Comments - We continue to evaluate the Risk Constructs and General Proposals of the previous week and review updates and merge in changes.

Week 3: Collateral Inclusion Polls - We start the week with an Inclusion Poll which allows for the individual approval of the prior two weeks’ General Proposals and Risk Constructs.

Week 4: Final Collateral Wrap-up Poll - We begin a governance poll which is a rollup of the previous weeks’ Inclusion Polls.


If this mandate is accepted by the community, it will signal its support for the new Governance Facilitator Role, Richard Brown as the first Interim Governance Facilitator, and signals support for the general scope of the initiatives outlined in this mandate.

This mandate should be considered a living document and will be updated based on community feedback.


I’ll add a poll to this thread next Monday at 4PM UTC to begin the signalling process for community support of the role.

The poll will run for 7 days and, if there is support, a formal poll will be added to the governance portal on August 26th at 4PM UTC.


I’ll give feedback on this over the next couple of days, but what is the rationale behind waiting to start the signalling process? Why not begin it now and run it for 14 days?

I’m thinking it’s weird to poll on a doc that could materially change after a person votes on it.


Catching up on current stuff, thoughts and responses to current discourse. Roughly half on governance facilitators, and half my conceptions of what scientific governance encompasses (especially relating to voting in any ratified actor).

First thoughts, more sporadic:

I’m not sure we can get enough demand without paying facilitators for the bulk of the work. It looks like a lot. Facilitation, coordination and refinement of complex information is a tough task.

If a facilitator has minimal decision making power, then a formal mechanisms for disagreeing with decisions shouldn’t be super necessary. A poll of confidence or satisfaction rating may be a useful tool for gauging sentiment, but I would be wary of letting decisions on teams/individuals be susceptible to a network wide vote at any moment. Then, a few whales could reorg at will. Restricting voting times and keeping facilitators for a set term reduces that specific risk.

Interested facilitators might be better off applying for grants from the governance apparatus. For example, apply for year long grant with some sort of midterm report/check up 6 months in the contract (or quarter or monthly, whatever we think most effective). In their application they would lay out their goals/hopes and the midterm report would relate progress and roadblocks to those ideas from their application.

MKR holders could release a general framework for the application. I’m thinking basic info, disclosure of mkr holdings to the community (arguments both ways), time in the community, other work done for the DAO, other experience, and statements regarding thoughts on the DAO and ideals for the future as well as controversial issues. If we are willing it could be a dynamic process. We could allow for applicants to define the amount/type of work they have bandwidth for, as well as an hourly rate. This lets governance more fully manage resources as well as more data to review the efficiency of the capital spent.

My second group of thoughts relates to the lack of science in some of our governance processes.
I think it’s a good time for MKR holders to recognize that “scientific” governance includes much more than math and engineering. The core principles document outlining scientific governance focuses mainly on risk management, failing to realize that risk cannot be fully captured in mathematical reductionist frameworks. I perceive that governance decisions must take into an account methods for growing social capital as an essential aspect of managing systemic risk.

My lazy google definition of science:
“The intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment.” (google, et al)

Science defines all Intellectual and actionable activity devoted to the systematic study of structured frameworks as well as the observations of stuff within those frameworks. As an analysis tool it must analyze itself in order to eventually react when paradigm shifts occur (new data/structures to consider).

For MKR holders that means to engage with scientific governance we need to fully consider the structures we utilize in context our goal of being a decentralized organization maintaining a global, sovereign, stable and secure socio-economic structure. Even the decision on how to set a framework for evaluating governance facilitators calls in a ton of questions about incentives, social relations between Maker ecosystem components, cultural differences and conflict resolution. To make wise decisions around expectations for these actors, MKR holders need to be informed by the social sciences such as interpersonal biology/psychology and sociology.

Economics is a social science as well, to ignore that aspect of our collective decision making in favor of more “rigorous” scientific thought appears imprecise. Reducing the scope and nature of our scientific inquiry fundamentally increases the systematic isolation of possible participants along with the robustness that comes with diversity of thought. Let’s face it masculine perspectives generally dominate the communities thinkspace.

No single team can encompass the demands of that goal obviously. The governance facilitators is a good place to start, I think, but I’d also like the community to consider incentivising sociological inquiry/research into our ecosystem. This will help inform the vortex of complexity MKR holders must juggle to achieve the goals. I hypothesize that fuller inclusion of scientific thought will help clarify, rather than obfuscate what this organization hope to achieve.


Are Facilitators also needed in different languages to ensure global access? IF so this would help diversify and decentralized the working of Maker governance. Hence, if I’m based in Singapore I probably won’t participate in much community affairs that are now more accessible to others–because of the time difference.

And if you do implement Facilitators based on languages, regions, will each Facilitator follow the same, or a different agenda? What are the characteristics needed to become a Facilitator? Does the Maker community understand the core values of Facilitation? If a vote is needed to choose the Facilitators, how will the values of each candidate be evaluated?


The hope is that we will eventually have Facilitators in all the major regions. What a ‘region’ is and what languages provide the most coverage is something the community will have to work out. Perhaps one each for NA, EU, LATAM, APAC, etc.

The Facilitators would have to collaborate very closely with each other to ensure that that same information is being broadcast to every region and that the issues from those demographics are brought back to the global community. Otherwise the role would just end up fragmenting and confusing the community instead of ‘facilitating governance’. Regardless, I don’t think we’ll be in a position to onboard additional Facilitators until after MCD launch. We’ll all need to understand how exactly the community can fund it’s own roles out of the Stability Fees first.

We’ve provided some guidelines above. The person would have to have deep insight into the workings of the MakerDAO and the crypto ecosystem, complete familiarity with our governance, basic understanding of finance and risk, etc. The rest of it basically falls into a general operations/project management type role I think. Make sure everything happens when it’s supposed to, make sure people know what is going on, be a good communicator, capable of writing docs, etc. Fix problems and organize people.

If they read the mandate posted above they should. I’m hesitant to get too deep into the weeds about core values though. This gig is 99% maintenance, paperwork, calendaring, moderation, and administration.

There isn’t a lot of leeway for a persons values to impact the role I hope; a facilitator should probably be focused on what the community’s values are and reflect those. GF’s should mostly be measured by their level of competence and ability to execute on the responsibilities listed above. This role is almost completely devoted to organizing, collating and helping to ratify things the way community wants it to.

So as usual, I’m going to focus on what I disagree with (just because it’s more useful.) But I’d like to preface my response by saying that in general I think that the proposal as outlined is detailed, effective and I agree with the need for a Governance Facilitator role. In general, my disagreements are around process.

1. We should not ratify multiple proposals in one vote.
While I accept that there is a desire for speed and efficiency here, I think it’s a terrible idea to vote for a package of proposals rather than a single one. In legacy democratic systems, voting and gathering signals takes a great deal of effort and expense. In the digital space and for MakerDAO, this is not the case. It would not be overly costly to setup separate forum+onchain polls for the following:

  • Ratification of the Governance Facilitator Role as described.
  • Ratification of Rich Brown as the Interim Governance Facilitator.
  • Ratification of the Proposed Collateral Onboarding Process.
  • Ratification of the Proposed Governance Cycle.

I recognise that these are not the focus of this document, but with the phrase:

I think it’s important to highlight that we are voting on all of these and that we shouldn’t be.

Some may ask why this is necessary: these are mostly non-controversial. The problem is the precedent we set. We need to set the right precedents early on non-controversial issues such as these rather than argue about it later. This is also consistent with signalling guideline 3: The topic should seek to gather signals for only a single issue. If you want multiple signals, make multiple topics. (Not saying we need multiple topics here, but multiple polls would be nice.)

  • Point 1: Agree
  • Point 1: Disagree

0 voters

2. We should poll as early as possible.

I think the above is unavoidable under a consensus decision making system (which I’ve argued elsewhere that we should use). While it is unintuitive, it is the most efficient way of gathering support and signals. The breakdown of responsibilities is:

  • The proposer keeps the proposal up-to-date with feedback based on comments and signals.
  • The signalling party keeps their signal up-to-date.

This requires signallers to check-in or respond to notifications on a specific post, but I’d argue that this is a relatively small cost that signallers are able to pay.

If we are worried about signals not being updated (and generating in inaccurate picture of consensus), we can close (replace?) the poll each time the proposal changes and require all participants to vote again. If people prefer this, please advocate for it in the signal guidelines thread.

In general there is virtually no cost to polling and it provides valuable information about the consensus around a proposal, I believe we should use it as often and as early as possible. (While writing I also realised it might be valuable to have polls within this post. So polls.)

  • Point 2: Agree
  • Point 2: Disagree

0 voters

3. The Roadmap is very compact, there is little time for discussion on this proposal or other ratification proposals.
For some of these proposals we have a single week for discussion before we move to an on-chain poll. This is perhaps less of an issue because we don’t have a large number of active and contributing members of the governance community. Even still, this could be interpreted as the Foundation wanting the Maker community to ‘rubber stamp’ these proposals by pushing through so much information and votes that no one has time to adequately judge or discuss them.

Everyone is excited for MCD and no one wants governance to hold up the process, I can see that. But I don’t want us to set bad precedents or for this to become our normal operating procedure. There was quiet for a long period (so much so that people were complaining about it.) Could we not have started this process earlier if we were worried about governance’s readiness for MCD launch?

  • Point 3: Agree
  • Point 3: Disagree

0 voters

4. There are many questions that will remain unanswered unless we pursue them in the future.

There are multiple questions here to answer about the role and about consensus and how we do things. I recognise that these are descriptions of what the Governance Facilitator will be facilitating, but in order for them to facilitate, there needs to be impetus from the community to find the answers.

It’s important to find these answers at a stage when there isn’t an alternative source of pressure comes into play. For example, we should decide on a process to remove a Governance Facilitator before we end up in a situation where we need to remove one. At that point, the priority shifts to fixing the problem (removing the bad actor) rather than creating a robust and future-proof process.

  • Point 4: Agree
  • Point 4: Disagree

0 voters

5. Support for Mitote’s points on the importance of the social aspects of scientific governance.

Specifically the above. We need to build a stable community around governance, and frankly it needs to be larger in terms of both participants and differing perspectives.

It’s incredibly important to recognise that by default, humans are not rational creatures. We need to work to mitigate this and promote the use of the scientific method not only around controlling risk, but around how we operate as a decision-making group.

  • Point 5: Agree
  • Point 5: Disagree

0 voters

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You are employed by the foundation as “Head of Community Development” correct? As interim Governance Facilitator would the foundation see your current role differently? For now is this essentially a symbolic volunteer title since your current paid job already encapsulates it?

I’d also like to know this.

There is some discussion to be had on the compensation for this role. I also don’t think we should expect anyone to do this without being paid. As you said, it’s a big job.

In the interim this money comes from the Foundation (presumably), but in the future, the DSS (Dai Stablecoin System) will need to be able to pay entities for services (Oracles, Risk Teams, Governance Facilitators etc.) For ongoing expenses, we should be able to pay salaries rather than use a proposal-grant system.

For one-off chunks of work being able to vote on and award grants would be great.

1. We should not ratify multiple proposals in one vote.

Agreed because

We need to set the right precedents early on non-controversial issues such as these rather than argue about it later.

2. We should poll as early as possible.

Agreed, but can votes be changed in the forum polls?

3. The Roadmap is very compact, there is little time for discussion on this proposal or other ratification proposals.

As I understand it, a vote for the mandate means a hard yes to the Governance Facilitator Role as a concept and to Rich Brown as the first IGF. It also signals tentative support for the processes/roadmap outlined in the post, but this is all evolving anyway. So I’m not concerned about rubber-stamping: very important points such as “IGF removal”, “IGF compensation”, and the many MCD-related decisions will still be completely open after a Governance Facilitator vote.

4. There are many questions that will remain unanswered unless we pursue them in the future.

Very much agreed.

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Votes can indeed be changed. If you hit ‘Hide Results’ It takes you back to the options and you can select again.


Definitely an option, my thinking is that a grant-proposal system allows for a more comprehensive evaluation construct. It looks like different governance facilitators could be involved to different degrees in the future. Personally I think this would help interested individuals work an amount congruent with their life.

I not totally up on the acronyms whats DSS?

This is a good point I hadn’t considered. My worry is that we don’t want to be paying in advance for a years salary, or be voting every month on people’s paychecks.

DSS = Dai Stablecoin System, basically the system of smart contracts that creates Dai that MKR holders govern. I’ve updated the other post to make this clear.

Is there any difference between DSS and DCS (Dai Credit System)?. It’s probably wise to use only 1 term if possible.

I don’t think there is, perhaps DCS would be better to use. I was going off of the github at, but apparently that stands for Dai Stablecoin Simulation. So I’m probably just wrong.

Personally I think Dai Stablecoin System is better than Dai Credit System. The stablecoin is the focus.


Totally, the only solution I can think of is a middle ground between them. Say, year long contract, but quarterly review (only required to vote if voting “remove” or wanting to defend the contract).


I don’t expect the community could attract a qualified individual without adequate compensation.

It will be very interesting to see how the community self-organizes around this, especially the particulars for funding ecosystem roles.

I think terrible might be a strong word here. Splitting it up into numerous sections has pros and cons, but more cons in my opinion. I’d much rather put a cohesive package in front of the community and, if there is contention, figure out why, find a middle ground, and, if none is forthcoming, then start breaking pieces out into individual polls.

Every step of complexity we add to this system will inevitably lead to additional steps. This represents a very real risk to governance. If we break these mandate packages out, what is the granularity? The major headings? Each one of the responsibilities? All the responsibilities but not the moderation duties? The whole calendar, parts of it, the calendar as a concept?

We have a great deal of work to do, I think we should be focusing not on whether we can do something, (or whether we lack the insight to see beyond precedent) and focus more on whether there is a need to add complexity to an already full workload.

It is critical that the community understands that these mandates aren’t commandments. They are living documents that describe the “general scope of the initiatives” as stated in the conclusion. It’s my expectation that they will be refreshed, updated, refined, regularly.

I’m not seeing why this is unavoidable or efficient.

It’s seems far more intuitive to post a proposal or a mandate, discuss for a set time period, integrate changes, respond to debates, then poll for a set time period. This thread is a perfect example. You have added a series of sub-polls that solicit community feedback on 5 issues that have gone un-answered by me up until now. Is it realistic to expect that the people that already voted had heard from all sides of the debate? That they will now return to the thread, re-read everything and update their votes? What additional confusion would be added if there was already a poll running on the GF mandate and I came in today (almost a week later) to materially change it based on community feedback?

Until we understand the community’s appetite for debate we need to make up numbers and then tweak as needed and then measure that level of debate against internal and external timelines. The calendar in the mandate is designed to align governance with the ecosystem actors and the foundations efforts to launch MCD.

It could be interpreted as that but I’d rather wait until someone makes that case before we alter our behavior based on it.

That’s kind of a metaphysical question. Yes, in theory. No, in practice :wink: Maker is a large scale software development project (arguably the base DeFi protocol) that is heavily dependent on a rapidly evolving space and has dependencies on a fantastic amount of external stakeholders.

The sheer number of external partners, market pressures, projects, internal legal, development, security, auditing, verification, integrations, business development, marketing, PR, risk, community, departments and initiatives, etc, etc, etc that all need to align is mind-numbing.

All those elements needed to sync and publish their own mini-roadmaps to create the items that need to be on the main roadmap which informed the governance roadmap that required a Facilitator which in turn needed to publish a mandate. The mandate needs to get ratified in a timely manner so the GF can ensure the milestones occur in way that ensures that governance isn’t the blocker for all the previously mentioned stakeholders.