MIP41c5-SP2: Facilitator Offboarding (RWF-001)

The proposal made by rune is destroying my confidence in Maker.
days ago , he proposal Sagittarius Engine dilution MKR to 3M ,
now , he want offboarding Seb @SebVentures who I think is genius guy in crypto.
Don’t listen to what people say, watch what they do .
when he said Clean money vision , what he do was Sagittarius Engine ,
when he said Arrangers model for scalable RWA, what he do is offboarding SebVentures.
@SebVentures earns my reputation not because he has founder logo , but his proof of work , great content contribute to the community( forum\twitter) .
I will strong against this proposal , Maker community should move forward together , we need group wisdom ,not office politics .


I know very little about the specific issue with Seb but wanted to comment regarding delegation. In my view, this kind of relationship is supposed to happen and is a good thing.

Large delegators have a right to ask their delegates to vote a certain way and delegates should indeed take that into account. Delegation makes it easier to vote but with or without it, the larger MKR holders have power to swing decisions their way. I’m all for delegates having their own thoughts but if it conflicts with their delegator’s wishes, the delegator is simply going to undelegate and vote directly.


Aren’t we holding a vote re Sebventures? So, if he “wins,” he stays, no?

If Seb wins, it’s tough beans, Rune, you lost. And if Seb loses, it’s bon voyage, mon ami. Am I missing something? This is MKR governance and politics at its finest.

Lastly, it seems like some ex-Foundation people (well, actually just one person) carry serious emotional baggage. I don’t think any of us in the DAO gives a rat’s ass about petty squabbles from years past and certainly don’t want to read about it here while there are more important things to do. Get a life.


Why did Rune make this proposal out of the blue without asking Seb about his opinion first? Airing personal discourse like this discourages potential investors.


I also think this has been handled sub-optimally.

@rune (as any other MKR holder) had all the rights to ask for Seb’s Offboarding using the MIP protocol. I wish He explained immediately his reasons and avoid the inevitable drama that was generated by the ‘mistery’ in his first post.

MakerDAO is not a democracy (power to people). It’s a MKRcracy (power to MKR holders).



This drama is completely unnecessary. Most of us (me included) are not qualified to debate what RWA structure is best for the DAO (my understanding is that there are at least two competing visions as to how to implement the legal structuring around RWAs so that it is safe for the DAO). Similarly I do not expect most MKR voters to fully appreciate the intricate details of different Rollup architectures and the technical risks associated with them. Many of you would love PE to enable DAI minting on sidechains such as Polygon. We are opposing this because we strongly feel that this is risky and insecure, whereas minting DAI on Rollups (both Optimistic and ZK) is not only possible, but recommended for future scaling. But if MKR holders feel otherwise, I would take it as a vote of non-confidence for my work and my research, and I will then have no choice but to step down. At the end of the day we all work for the DAO. Peace.


This topic might blow up into the wild (crypto-press, etc.) so I just wanted to make a couple of clarifications.

Maker Governance

  • Maker is not a democracy. It’s a plutocracy.
    • If any contributor wants to work for a democracy, there are several Nation-States hiring.
  • @Rune is a big MKR holder. Lots of skin in the game. How this is news to anyone is beyond me.
  • Any contributor should “respect and fear” any MKR holder. They’re the ones with skin in the game.
  • A working process that removes a person (or a component) should not be viewed as a bad thing.
    • I like @SebVentures on a personal note and think he’s done a lot of things for Maker (he could still contribute, in my opinion)
    • more importantly: we should expect MKR holders to have a system or process to change things.
  • Anyone can propose a Maker Improvement Proposal.

Feedback in a DAO

  • Giving feedback in a DAO is extremely hard.
    • There is no anonymity (some people create burners/socket-puppets)
    • There is a disconnect (at least some) between the forum and the on-chain polls
    • There is a lot of noise and “drama”
    • People tend to listen more to positive feedback than negative feedback
  • The process proposed by @SebVentures received at least some feedback
    • Loudest voices (that I remember) were @g_dip and @PaperImperium
    • I’m not sure if the feedback was dismissed, but I don’t remember it being well-received
    • I might be wrong about that last point, but my point is that there was at least “some conversation”

Feedback in general

  • I’ve seen over and over again Core Units / to-be Core Units minimizing the feedback received and being surprised with particular outcomes of the MKR holders.
  • Usually, instead of taking the feedback, the comments are flagged as bullying/flaming/disrespectful.
  • Advice to anyone in any DAO: when the immune system kicks in, listen (this is not that easy because of the noise).
  • Contributors / Core Units should be proactive in getting alignment from the Delegates / MKR holders / Governance (talk to your Facilitator if this is not happening).



Agree to what @Tosh9.0 said → there should be a vote.
@rune why don’t you set up a new protocol/project for the Sagittarius Engine and MakerDAO could be part of it? I really like the idea but I think MakerDAO shouldn’t be changed as a whole… Maker could provide services for the project, similar the D3M.


Ignoring the commentary so far, I’d like to comment on a few things that made this situation worse than it needed to be, with the hope that we can avoid them in the future. Multiple people now have messaged me because they’re concerned about how this played out, community members, core unit members, core unit facilitators, etc. I have also spoken to both @Rune and @SebVentures separately.

  1. The proposal was too ambiguous, and written in a way that was certain to invite questions. People expect voluntary offboarding to be written by the individual in question. Rune’s proposal blurs too many lines and doesn’t fit into peoples expectations of this process.

    • It references speaking to Seb in a positive way, but does not claim that this was voluntary (because it wasn’t.)
    • It thanks Seb for his professionalism and references an orderly transition implying the inverse correlation (rocking the boat means Seb is unprofessional.)
    • The reference to private conversations also creates this ambiguity and unease.
  2. The proposal was posted at the same time as the proposal onboarding Will Remor (also posted by Rune.)

    • This further impacts ambiguity above.
    • This makes it look way more like the author has arranged to have the individual replaced (which is accurate.)
    • The fact that this other proposal was not posted by Will Remor further aggravates this issue, as once again, it does not meet peoples expectations for onboarding facilitators.
  3. SebVentures initial response was also kind of ambiguous, this futher added to the confusion, though I do appreciate that Seb could have reacted much, much worse in this situation.

    • It again muddied the waters between voluntary/involuntary as Seb (understandably) reacted as if this was a done deal and essentially ‘made his goodbyes.’
    • It also signals that he is nontheless unhappy with the situation.
  4. Other random point…

    • Posting this on Saturday was mildly annoying. There is no reason it couldn’t have waited until Monday when people were around to react. It’s a minor point, but it means that for many people it’s something that happened while they weren’t around.

To conclude, this is basically the worst of both worlds (transparent and behind-closed-doors) because it’s clear that behind-closed-doors things went on due to the nature of the proposals and the manner of their being made public, but none of the reasoning was made transparent, leaving everyone confused and concerned.

I appreciate Rune and SebVentures attempts to avoid airing dirty laundry, but seriously, it is possible to communicate reasons-to-offboard without it being hugely dramatic or controversial, especially when combined with appreciation for all of the work done so far. I think that if the reasons from Rune’s second post had been present in the initial proposal in addition to the positive sentiment, much of the ambiguity and drama could have been avoided. People would have been able to react to the proposal itself, rather than reacting to the ambiguity.

This also badly needs addressing, but I will do so in another thread to avoid this one going further off-topic.


I would like to cosign onto this statement as well and don’t have much to add. I had a very limited role in RWA to review the People’s Company proposal and mitigate risk with the proposal backed by income from farmlands. The proposal was signalled as one the DAO wanted to move forward with, and I always thought Seb brought competence, fairness and flexibility with how to structure the “ask” and the risk review. I brought critique to the early proposal, and in a DAO way of doing things, he asked me to help join to mitigate risk.

The allegations of “personal entanglement” to me seem grossly unfair and can very easily be reflected back on the newer “Arranger” proposal as well. There seems to have been alot of team building, and arranging behind the scenes to explore this seachange shift.

Why would Seb’s company perhaps have to sign up to have legal counsel? Well, the DAO doesn’t have (currently) a legal body from which it can obtain privity of contract and engage an attorney, clear conflicts, etc. It is a completely unfair critique to use this to levy allegations of personal entanglement (whatever that means) and that the RWA proposals aren’t legally structured in a manner to the liking of the DAO. The Foundation on the other hand does(or did) have legal status to engage counsel. Why didn’t it research these legal engineering models and publish the results on behalf of the DAO?

This is the exact relationship that it would appear that the ENS DAO will contemplate. To have the Foundation provide support to the DAO.

Much of this is before my time, so I am sure I am missing critical information of the purpose of the Foundation, but the critique seems empty when levied at the few people actually trying to carry out the “will” of the DAO that was done through the governance process.

I guess that brings the question of whether token weighted governance works? I don’t know, but I do know to have a DAO even sorta work it requires the constituents to participate, to have open and transparent communication, and be able to debate and resolve conflict (hopefully mostly in the open).

There appear to be competing visions for MakerDAO which I will probably grossly mischaracterize. 1). Become a regulated entity and back dai with mostly sovereign and high quality debt. This is what I think (apologies if not) Paper might want.
2) The current RWA strategy which appear split between the Rune and Seb camps. Rune’s the Arranger model (which parts I sorta like) and Seb’s idea is to get some stuff done, work out kinks, and move up the food chain to S&P rated debt and build some teams around certain asset classes. For example tenant financing (New Silver).
3). Stop! and only do RWA to the extent that they are “tokens” with deep liquidity and can have onchain oracles and be able to be “liquidated” in a block as is done with most other tokens.

It would seem to me that such a profound and deep rewriting of the current strategy of the DAO should probably go up for a more robust governance process where it can be duly debated and to the extent necessary also staffed. ESG investing itself is fraught with risk, regulatory risk, construction risk, technological obsolescence risk and hiding in New Zealand doesn’t really seem to be derisking strategy. Hope this discussion can result in a stronger and more capable DAO.


Close enough. Mostly because then sovereigns can’t rug us without a credit event or a bond dump.


Hey everyone! Wall of text incoming

Clearly there’s a lot of drama and it would be great if we could avoid it. But the reality is that we can’t, because what’s basically happening is for the first time the DAO is starting to grapple with the fact that we are a business, and it’s not always fun and games.Sometimes there is disagreement. Sometimes people have to be fired.

Overall I’m actually quite happy with how the conversation is going. We are learning something that will eventually become our second nature - how to handle conflict and then just go back to doing stuff.

In a normal business, you deal with these things by controlling it through hierarchy. Nobody has to hear the details when someone gets fired, the boss can just make the call, and there is just a CEO at the top who is accountable for the results of the entire business, so they will delegate to ensure the hierarchy is properly firing people when its necessary.

In MakerDAO there is no boss and nobody to make the call, and everyone is invited to be a part of every decision. Anyone and everyone can attempt to fire someone, and it will always just be an attempt. Disagremeent turning into drama is a natural byproduct of such conditions and that’s why we’ve always had some of the spiciest drama in all of crypto since the dawn of time.

In hindsight it was overly optimistic of me to hope that I could have gone through with this without having to get into the details and basically force us to open up this whole dimension of governance. It was a unique situation where we had an individual with a lot of political momentum who had built up significant private entanglement before the community was even aware of the concept, and in an environment where there basically exists no organized representation of MKR holders. I believe the best option was to just deal with it before it had a chance to grow into something even more explosive.

I think a key takeaway is that we are naive to expect Maker governance will run drama and politics free. We’ll have to just learn the handle it.

I know that today - since it is the first time we experience it - what’s happening seems shocking to many people. This is the painful reality of being both a community of friends and a business that is governed by capital. Facilitator offboardings will happen. We need to simply get used to it, and accept and learn to deal with the drama that occurs when there’s conflict about facilitator positions (and soon other stuff, such as contentious collateral related decisions).

MKR holders absolutely must have the ability to vote out Facilitators, and anyone should have the right to propose it, just like they can propose anything else with the MIP framework.

@rune you need to understand that a démocracy is way less efficient than a dictatorship. If it was true that Sébastien has done a bad job, eventually this would have come up, but in a very différent (and probably more respectful) way.

If Seb simply continued growing his private entanglement with no opposition there’s very little chance it would be possible for the maker governance we’re used to today (with basically no active MKR holders) to fire him. We would be entirely reliant on him passing on the reins voluntarily ​and being honest enough to not abuse the power to extract budgets etc. Whether his replacement would do the same is even more difficult to predict.

I know it seems like it might be in your best interest as a mandated actor to advocate for making the facilitator offboarding process as inaccessible as possible and not be something that we deliberately seek out (which is how I’m interpreting your point about waiting for it to “eventually come up”). But the reality is that this would backfire badly in the long term. Once you put in place generalized barriers to replace facilitators (whether it is social expectations or anything else) we begin going down the path of the Iron Law of Bureaucracy The Iron Law of Bureaucracy where it becomes possible for a group of Mandated Actors to operate explicitly against the interests of MKR holders to their own benefit (chiefly by trying to expand the barriers against governance actions that could harm them).

I believe instead everyone will be much better off if we leave the process for offboarding facilitators open and accessible, and instead focus on ensuring that all facilitators have the confidence of MKR holders and know they have the votes to back it up. As a Facilitator, you shouldn’t be grasping at straws and fighting with shadows. You should have an easy time to get direct access to the delegates and MKR holders that have opinions about your area of focus, and it should be a clear and smooth two-way street of dialogue that ensures that as a Facilitator you always know two very important things: 1) Do I have the MKR votes ready to back me up if someone tries to offboard me? and 2) If I don’t have the votes, what can I do to get the votes?

If there’s enough clarity about these things then being a Facilitator shouldn’t be a particularly hard or unpredictable job. If you are competent, honest, can follow rules and operate in a political environment then over time you should simply just build up more and more trust that naturally makes you stronger in the role.

So now we are starting to get into the topic of the Decentralized Workforce, which is a framework I’m proposing that’s meant to deal with exactly this. The point is to make the information flows and political dynamic as explicit possible, and to try to map out all possible interactions and outcomes so that whenever you have particular types of disagreement or other types of governance dynamics, the community should generally know and be prepared for how it will play out.

Central to this framework is the concept of Voter Committees, which is meant to be a place where actively voting MKR holders with no other interest in the system than holding MKR (“MKR Mafia”) can directly interact with delegates, as well as facilitators and other political actors in the decentralized workforce. Any problems or concerns that should arise about a particular Facilitator, will always come up first and foremost in the Voter Committee, so as a Facilitator you don’t have to be worried about people complaining about you out of sight in hidden conversations. You know exactly where any potential complaining would happen and can meet it head on, and most likely instead of becoming a standoff and a governance disagreement or even drama, it instead becomes an opportunity for compromise and shared learning and evolution.

One last thing I want to put here is a lecture titled " Why our generals were more successful in World War II than in Korea, Vietnam or Iraq/Afghanistan" which is about how a change in the political approach towards replacing generals in the US Army explains how they went from dominating in WW2 to then failing in Vietnam, Abu Ghraib etc

The TL;DR is that if you often replace people in high positions, it becomes normalized and stops being a politically sensitive issue. Instead of being a career ender, it just becomes a normal part of how you organize things. This enables a high level of flexibility and adaptability and prevents you from getting stuck in a dysfunctional patterns.

On the other hand, if you are not normalizing replacing people, then it becomes a stigmatizing career ender and as a result it barely gets used at all because the stigma means it involves huge amount of drama and political struggle. And then you have conditions where people everyone knows are unfit to do an important job, still get to keep it to the detriment of everyone else.

I believe that this dynamic can also occur with facilitators in Maker, and it is vital that we choose the path of normalizing facilitator replacements and simply make sure that being an ex-facilitator is a good thing, not a stain on your CV, and that we then replace or attempt to replace Facilitators any time there’s a good reason to do so - while of course also simultaneously adopting frameworks that make it crystal clear to Facilitators what kind of actions they can take to consolidate their MKR voter support, and proactively prevent the occurrence of “good reasons to remove them”.

One very last, final note I want to make is just clarity on my MKR voting patterns. I have not done any voting personally for several years, and right now I am delegating across most of the delegates, but not actively voting myself and also not actively influencing the delegates.

Of the delegates I’ve delegated to, I’ve mostly spoken to PaperImperium and Planet_x in the past. Planet_x I no longer delegate anything to, and I delegate a relatively small amount to Paperimperium. I’ve had probably one conversation with Elpro, and no real interaction with any of the other delegates.

I don’t intend to strong arm this process, the delegates will vote as they want - ultimately it would be completely pointless for me try to force something like this on the community, as I have zero interest in setting myself up to perpetually fight alone against other MKR governance whales.

Now I think we just have to sit back and let the process do its thing.


I am shocked by how the video linked by @rune is appropriate to the current discussion.

I am a youtube nerd, and love to watch long seminars. If you are not, I suggest you at least jump to min 29:42 :slight_smile:


Dunno, it could be argued that the US was more successful in WW2 because the Soviets did most of the heavy lifting for us. Obviously getting off topic here. :nerd_face:

Also you’ll want to read the fictional Cryptonomicon for a well-rounded understanding of WW2. :nerd_face: :nerd_face:


@rune (and everyone) In reading the facts outlined, this situation has good analogy to US corporate governance - an active investor that is not in day-to-day charge but has a large equity position and has visions for improving the company that aren’t square with current management. Notwithstanding the power that investor yields, we usually resist that active investor jumping in and chopping the heads off of first-level management and replace them. Such a move, as I believe would here, sets the company back substantially on knowledge and wisdom gained, not to mention sends a demoralizing message of powerlessness to other stakeholders. A solution many times worked out is that that investor is given a dedicated board seat so that they are always in the room where it happens and can directly influence macro direction of the company and influence first-level management to a great degree.

What I pose is, is there a possible compromise in the line of @SebVentures continues to do his job and you instead propose installation of some person that he is required to consult or work with, or in part oversees him?


Perhaps this “middle ground” solution should be included with the MKR vote as an add-on to whether Seb is completely removed or whether he stays on as is.

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One option would be to onboard Will as a second facilitator of RWF without removing Seb (assuming they’re both still willing to work together.) That may allow everyone to work in the areas they most want to work in. Seb can focus on the financial and accounting aspect, and Will can work on decentralizing the RWA onboarding process. In the future I could see the unit forking into two around those specializations.

Alternatively, Will could create a new Core Unit that specifically takes over real world assets, and the current real world finance core unit could continue to be led by SebVentures, and could refocus on accounting and metric tracking.

To be honest there are lots of options.


Excellent points, Long. It can go through a million different permutations if we want. Just to keep it to a reasonable limit, and not let us go through “analysis paralysis” perhaps governance can cap the number of options at 5 (or some other relatively low number)? Tough call for sure.

I know that some are loving the drama and feel (or want to feel) like this is a public lynching.

We are NOT discussing the future of @SebVentures in Maker.
Many members of the Community have worked with him in the past and will be happy to keep working with him (myself included).

Eventually, it’s up to Seb to decide what he wants to do with his time.

Yes, the permutations are infinite, but that is not what is being discussed here.

This subproposal (if formally submitted) will be binary.


Thanks for your post and good points. It is a good analogy to how it works in companies, and what best practices for a traditional company is.

But I would argue that Maker shouldn’t seek to emulate how a company is organized when it comes to the highest level of decision making. In particular I think it is fatal if we allow MKR holders to simply be passive shareholders that delegate all responsibility to a hierarchical management that in practice holds the power and are then kept in check through promises, legal structure and legal threats.

The reason why activist shareholders shouldn’t have to “micromanage” which manager should leave is because in a traditional hierarchical organization there’s a CEO whose job it is to run an aligned team. At worst, shareholders would replace the board, who’d then replace the CEO.

In a DAO, there are no such roles. The closest we might get are meta-governance core units that may recommend offboarding a particular facilitator based on some collected data measured against best practices and benchmarks, but this can’t be compared to a CEO at all, because meta-governance core units would only have the ability to recommend such action to MKR holders, not actually take the action themselves (and this has a profound impact on the political dynamics of such a situation).

And I think it really should be obvious that if we go down the path of having a CEO and a traditional org structure, it will not take long before we find ourselves as a centralized entity that will get crushed by banking regulation, and have no possibility of defending against it because it has lost the capability to operate in a decentralized manner.

I think a much better analogy is to compare the highest level of Maker Governance to political systems rather than corporate systems. In that case, a MIP to replace a facilitator coming from an MKR holder is like attempting to recall a senator - except in Maker there are no term limits so it is a much more fundamental process that has to function well, or the DAO will not be able to remain decentralized over time.

There’s some critical context for all of this that we first discovered way back in 2015: A DAO is extremely vulnerable to corruption, significantly more than a government or a company, because of its decentralization which inherently means you can’t assume you can trust people, and there is no strong central point that can fight back and crack down on corruption. The solution is to have a “decentralized immune response” where the DAO has to be able to mobilize a grassroots response to potential issues anywhere in a bureaucracy or governance systems that emerge. There also needs to be as many support functions as possible in place, such as meta-governance core units - but they can also run into issues, so in the end the backbone of a DAO must just be an active and strong decentralized community of token holders that have the means to coordinate to control the DAO whenever there is broad agreement that it is necessary to make changes. There’s also a nuance of this that can be a bit difficult for me to describe - but basically it is not just whether MKR holders can technically take action to change things, it is also whether they are conditioned to actively even consider whether they should do so. The second part is actually just as important as the first, if not even more so.

From this perspective I believe that MKR holders removing a facilitator that has been involved in private entanglement (which itself touches on the issue of the power balance between MKR holders and the bureaucracy) is really a routine, basic function. It’s something that we need to prove will happen in all cases, because if you can’t count on that happening, you would expect the DAO to naturally be pushed towards centralizing itself over time.

I also really disagree that we should keep Seb but then begin to micromanage him. I just have the completely opposite viewpoint - if someone has reached a point where you need to micromanage them, you are better off replacing them. Going down the path of micromanagement is not a sensible compromise, it’s a recipe for disaster.

Iammeoh shared the quote from the generals lecture that goes “swift relief is the price of autonomy”. Either we support Seb and give him autonomy to operate the way he believes is best, or we simply replace him and encourage him to go somewhere else in the ecosystem where he can act with autonomy and fully leverage his skills and passion. If we try to micromanage him to do things that go against his own nature, we are setting ourselves up for failure because if micromanagement by MKR holders becomes a thing then we will destroy efficiency in the Core Units and create a true bureaucratic nightmare.