MIP57: RWA Committee

so essentially what you propose is having a similar way like PPG but not about parameters but about “higher level topics”?

in this case it might make sense to phrase it like the PPG-MIP and just let those commitees form in a similar way?

of… do they need to be acknowledges formally by an onchain poll (which is not the case for PPGs)?

Trying to wrap my head around how this would work.

So the committee meets once per month and produces recommendations that go through an off-chain vote involving the members. After that happens, is that recommendation binding? Does the recommendation need to go to an on-chain vote to become binding? What happens if the recommendations are not followed?

The value of this group is to create universal guidance around any RWAs that come to Maker while leaving the individual deal analysis in the hands of those specialized teams and so for that reason I am interested in seeing this further discussed and developed but I do wonder if existing CUs can create these recommendations themselves?

Yes, I’d say this is a primary difference. Since these topics are high level and globally applicable to RWA, I think it’s appropriate that the MKR holders ratify the guidance.

See the above replies to Schuppi. Everything goes through MKR holders after the committee votes, and things are only as “binding” as guidance can be.

They can and I don’t think the committee and CUs are mutually exclusive. I do think that committees are able to attract broader representation than a core unit (which is quite specialized), which is why I’m excited about this experiment. I’ll add that the stakes are very low if this doesn’t work out, but there’s an asymmetric opportunity to contemplate and bring to light issues that are otherwise difficult to coordinate on.

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maybe it is just me, but: if the onchain approved guidance things are just as binding as guidance can be what exactly is the value here? especially if CUs can just don’t care at all.

In the end MKR holders are going to judge the performance of CUs based on the value they add to the protocol / revenue they generate for MKR holders.

It feels a bit like a “Software Engineering Standards Committee” that tells @Protocol-Engineering that they need to care more about cohesion (just making up a random example) - but in the end the CU just does not care and continues delivering what they deliver. And then imagine this guidance being voted on onchain :wink:

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I think you’ve branched into “what is governance?” I think it’s an interesting conversation to have and I tried to scratch the surface here. I’d be happy to pick up the conversation in another thread.

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well, that was not convincing enough for me to support this MIP… thanks anyway :wink:

i guess it would make a lot more sense to me if this would be structured like MIP46

  • the MIP should provide a framework, not a new instance / list of initial people
  • new instances of those committees do not hold any power (similar to PPGs, just proposing stuff) - so no need to formally ack them onchain, make it easy to spawn them

but even if this is solved, the main point remains: this is just a debating club, not actually tasked or empowered. it does not solve any problem (at least I don’t see it yet) that a RWA-related CU cannot solve - so no need to formalize it through a MIP

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I honestly think we just have a difference in opinion as to the role of Core Units and the mechanics of governance. I tried to outline my thinking in my “What is a DAO” post, so that’s why I pointed to it. It’s a shame I couldn’t win you over but nevertheless I appreciate your feedback and engagement! :pray:

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I lean towards Schuppi’s view as well.

  • Do MKR voters really need to be involved in voting between recommendations of this group during stalemates?
  • I would also support redoing this MIP in a MIP46 style. Do MKR voters need to be the ones to vote people into this committee? If we don’t vote in the members of rate proposal groups, why should we vote in people to this RWA recommendations group?

Though I disagree with Schuppi that it is “just” a debating club, and for that reason it is somehow not very valuable. I think with the right membership this group can produce impactful guidance that will help us navigate the RWA business wisely, so I am in favor of the existence of such a group.

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I will counter with, why don’t the MKR holders vote for the members of PPGs? I thought they did tbh. I would advocate to change that.

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i did not say it is not valueable - the whole forum is built upon debates.

but if it is not having a special mandate yet speaking of enforcing anything - why even formalize?

no one is stopped from expressing opinions, forming groups, pushing signal requests to onchain - totally without any special construct like described in this MIP.

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Legitimacy. At the end of the day 90% of governance is about legitimacy, and only MKR holders can bestow it. We need to keep governance close to the MKR holders.

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I think I’m missing something.

Can someone point out why a group (of experts) specialized in proposing guidelines for a certain topic (that are going to be voted by Governance) is a bad idea?


@g_dip , may I suggest you separating the MIP from the group (and include this group in the first subproposal to this MIP).

If you want to abstract it one more layer, you could also abstract the topic (a bit like MIP39 + MIP41). You could use this MIP to create another group (another subproposal) to give suggestions about almost anything with another set of people (another subproposal).

Let me know if I’m not making sense and I’ll get a MIP Editor to articulate it better. :smiley:

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This sounds like a good idea from a process perspective. Could you perhaps show me how to do it? :slight_smile:

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@Davidutro I did not want really enter into the merit of the debate regarding PPGs and MIP. But I reckon I would have to, given maybe some misconception (or my misunderstanding, whichever is true). Recently, I asked the question of whether the existing PPG group was open for memberships. It was a simple Y/N question. There are reasons related to efficiency etc that may warrant not opening new memberships, which I totally understand and actually even agree to a large extent.

But from a governance stand point, I do not think the current set up of groups that have a significant impact on the protocol have necessarily an “open door policy”. I would rather say, let’s not fool ourselves here and give ourselves a tap in the back saying we’re doing great in that regard. So, maybe voting is not such a bad thing. I would advocate for credentials as well for some specific groups, such as risk parameter policies groups. Do people have a background in risk management (skill AND experience) and so on to be there in the first place (I do for once). But I understand the idea of credentials is not always well perceived or popular in the community. I just think it as a way of submitting an application. And then it is easier for MKR voters to vote on a group if they wish/need/want to.

With regards to multiple groups, PPGs or this one, while the idea of redundancy is nice, I believe the execution is not. (Greg we’ll just agree to disagree here :slight_smile: ) In the current stage of maturity of the DAO, redundancy is maybe too soon in my view. It can be rather inefficient, messy and confusing for MKR tokenholders. So I lean more towards good, efficient AND legitimate groups. But that “legitimacy power” warrants some sort of self-regulation in my view, internal or through voting. Otherwise, it evolves from legitimacy to cronyism. That is one of the biggest problems I see Maker facing already now and exponentiating in the future. I’ve worked in banking for many years, it was full of cliquey self-appointed groups (“closed doors policy”) for everything, including in risk management. Many of those groups were created well intentioned at the inception and evolved to cronyism overtime. I would rather not see Maker going down the same path.

TLDR: If we do not want to go down the tradFi route, we need first to understand what tradFi does bad with regards to working group organisation and then how we can do better

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Sure. I’ll reach out through DM.

Or if the @MIP-Editors are reading… cough cough.

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Juan is suggesting a committee-spawning MIP–so something more like a committee framework. You can possibly restrict such a thing to only one MIP (as opposed to, say, MIP39 + MIP41). I’d probably go something like:

  • MIP57c1: Definitions
    • Rationale
  • MIP57c2: Onboard Committee
    • Process component. Subproposal template should define a scope for the committee work, maybe something akin to a mandate, initial member list, et cetera.
  • MIP57c3: Offboard Committee
    • Process component
  • MIP57c4: Add Member
    • Process component. Subproposal template should specify both member and committee they will be added to
  • MIP57c4: Remove Member
    • Process component. Subproposal template should specify both member and committee they will be removed from
  • MIP57c5: List of Active Committees
    • See MIP38 for inspiration

Essentially, it would be pretty much a simplified version of the Core Unit Framework (MIP38, MIP39, MIP40, MIP41).

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As the MIPs Portal gets upgraded, this might become obsolete (as querying for Active MIP39 subproposals should give you that same list.

@LongForWisdom? Please remind us of the modus operandi?

Also, should we separate Committee from Member (into two different MIPs) for that same reason?

I agree with everything you’ve said here. The design decision of having MKR holders have total control over membership is my best attempt to avoid exactly the circumstances you’ve described.

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What is the point of legitimacy if it’s not to get leverage on something?

What you are saying is correct in theory. But it doesn’t need to be a MIP. Why not having those discussions publicly on the forum and allowing everyone that is competent to help to craft those guidelines?

The RWF published some work on our research (here, here and here) to create a legal structure to manage RWA. Happy to have the committee experts comment on those topics.

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Can we push your argument forward and say that we don’t need ANY MIP? We’ll just vote on spells. We will discuss this in the forums and come to a consensus.

What you’re saying is correct in theory. But we need to scale the DAO. We’ll soon reach the Dunbar’s number, and then hold on, Catalina.