maybe it is just me, but: if the onchain approved guidance things are just as binding as guidance can be what exactly is the value here? especially if CUs can just don’t care at all.
In the end MKR holders are going to judge the performance of CUs based on the value they add to the protocol / revenue they generate for MKR holders.
It feels a bit like a “Software Engineering Standards Committee” that tells @Protocol-Engineering that they need to care more about cohesion (just making up a random example) - but in the end the CU just does not care and continues delivering what they deliver. And then imagine this guidance being voted on onchain
well, that was not convincing enough for me to support this MIP… thanks anyway
i guess it would make a lot more sense to me if this would be structured like MIP46
the MIP should provide a framework, not a new instance / list of initial people
new instances of those committees do not hold any power (similar to PPGs, just proposing stuff) - so no need to formally ack them onchain, make it easy to spawn them
but even if this is solved, the main point remains: this is just a debating club, not actually tasked or empowered. it does not solve any problem (at least I don’t see it yet) that a RWA-related CU cannot solve - so no need to formalize it through a MIP
I honestly think we just have a difference in opinion as to the role of Core Units and the mechanics of governance. I tried to outline my thinking in my “What is a DAO” post, so that’s why I pointed to it. It’s a shame I couldn’t win you over but nevertheless I appreciate your feedback and engagement!
Do MKR voters really need to be involved in voting between recommendations of this group during stalemates?
I would also support redoing this MIP in a MIP46 style. Do MKR voters need to be the ones to vote people into this committee? If we don’t vote in the members of rate proposal groups, why should we vote in people to this RWA recommendations group?
Though I disagree with Schuppi that it is “just” a debating club, and for that reason it is somehow not very valuable. I think with the right membership this group can produce impactful guidance that will help us navigate the RWA business wisely, so I am in favor of the existence of such a group.
Can someone point out why a group (of experts) specialized in proposing guidelines for a certain topic (that are going to be voted by Governance) is a bad idea?
@g_dip , may I suggest you separating the MIP from the group (and include this group in the first subproposal to this MIP).
If you want to abstract it one more layer, you could also abstract the topic (a bit like MIP39 + MIP41). You could use this MIP to create another group (another subproposal) to give suggestions about almost anything with another set of people (another subproposal).
Let me know if I’m not making sense and I’ll get a MIP Editor to articulate it better.
@Davidutro I did not want really enter into the merit of the debate regarding PPGs and MIP. But I reckon I would have to, given maybe some misconception (or my misunderstanding, whichever is true). Recently, I asked the question of whether the existing PPG group was open for memberships. It was a simple Y/N question. There are reasons related to efficiency etc that may warrant not opening new memberships, which I totally understand and actually even agree to a large extent.
But from a governance stand point, I do not think the current set up of groups that have a significant impact on the protocol have necessarily an “open door policy”. I would rather say, let’s not fool ourselves here and give ourselves a tap in the back saying we’re doing great in that regard. So, maybe voting is not such a bad thing. I would advocate for credentials as well for some specific groups, such as risk parameter policies groups. Do people have a background in risk management (skill AND experience) and so on to be there in the first place (I do for once). But I understand the idea of credentials is not always well perceived or popular in the community. I just think it as a way of submitting an application. And then it is easier for MKR voters to vote on a group if they wish/need/want to.
With regards to multiple groups, PPGs or this one, while the idea of redundancy is nice, I believe the execution is not. (Greg we’ll just agree to disagree here ) In the current stage of maturity of the DAO, redundancy is maybe too soon in my view. It can be rather inefficient, messy and confusing for MKR tokenholders. So I lean more towards good, efficient AND legitimate groups. But that “legitimacy power” warrants some sort of self-regulation in my view, internal or through voting. Otherwise, it evolves from legitimacy to cronyism. That is one of the biggest problems I see Maker facing already now and exponentiating in the future. I’ve worked in banking for many years, it was full of cliquey self-appointed groups (“closed doors policy”) for everything, including in risk management. Many of those groups were created well intentioned at the inception and evolved to cronyism overtime. I would rather not see Maker going down the same path.
TLDR: If we do not want to go down the tradFi route, we need first to understand what tradFi does bad with regards to working group organisation and then how we can do better
Juan is suggesting a committee-spawning MIP–so something more like a committee framework. You can possibly restrict such a thing to only one MIP (as opposed to, say, MIP39 + MIP41). I’d probably go something like:
MIP57c2: Onboard Committee
Process component. Subproposal template should define a scope for the committee work, maybe something akin to a mandate, initial member list, et cetera.
MIP57c3: Offboard Committee
MIP57c4: Add Member
Process component. Subproposal template should specify both member and committee they will be added to
MIP57c4: Remove Member
Process component. Subproposal template should specify both member and committee they will be removed from
What is the point of legitimacy if it’s not to get leverage on something?
What you are saying is correct in theory. But it doesn’t need to be a MIP. Why not having those discussions publicly on the forum and allowing everyone that is competent to help to craft those guidelines?
The RWF published some work on our research (here, here and here) to create a legal structure to manage RWA. Happy to have the committee experts comment on those topics.
Hey guys, the goal of this committee is simple - to advise both the DAO and RWF core unit on topics related to RWA. As Greg clarified multiple times the goal is to support the community with expertise, but the final decision is taken either by the CU or by the DAO.
So, I’m going to mirror what a few others have said here, and say that I don’t think this needs to be a MIP. I want to make it clear that I think the group itself is a good idea, and I think it makes a lot of sense to have a group of experts advising the DAO. My issues with this are solely based on the governance implications of passing this. I’ll summarize my objections here:
#1 This committee has no powers beyond those of any community member.
This is explicitly stated in the motivation section.
If this committee’s power is limited to making recommendations to governance, then it doesn’t need a MIP. Anyone can already make recommendations to governance by virtue of this being a DAO, governance might not listen to them, but anyone can make them. Ultimately this group could operate entirely without this MIP, and if it can, then it should (no need to add additional governance considerations for MKR Holders that already have a lot to deal with.)
#2 Passing this MIP implies that the community is unable to make recommendations without working under a similar structure.
Basically, if you pass a MIP that says ‘This group has this power to do this thing’ then it becomes more reasonable to ask why other groups / individuals are doing that same thing without a similar MIP. Does governance want to have to approve groups of people before they can advise the DAO?
It doesn’t seem like a great implication to make. And at scale, this system is completely untenable. Maker Governance is not going to care when membership of one of twenty groups changes.
#3 This MIP actually adds on-going governance burden.
The requirement for governance to elect members to a group which can advise the DAO is even more pointless. anyone can advise the DAO. Maker governance should not be choosing who can or can’t advise the DAO in either the general case (voting to approve groups like this,) or the specific case (choosing which individuals are part of these groups.)
Furthermore, even beyond the election of people to a group that can do the same as everyone else in the DAO, there is a requirement for Maker governance to resolve the internal disagreement in the advisory group? Why should Maker governance care if the group disagrees internally? Just publish both points of view.
And again with the other requirements… Why do MKR Holders need a say on how the group internally organises itself? On the quorum, on the pass threshold, etc. By all means implement and publicize these things, they are important things to include in any such group, and for transparency reasons, it would be great to include how votes fall out when the group makes these recommendations. But Maker Governance doesn’t need to vote on how the group works! The group itself should manage this internally.
There is a reason I setup the PPG MIP the way I did. It adds zero governance burden, it just requires that groups existence, goals and members be publicized for transparency reasons, such that Maker Governance knows who is producing the given proposals and such that Governance Facilitators (or anyone frankly) can check that proposals are in-line with stated goals.
If you want to setup a non-proposing PPG-similar framework. PRG? (parameter recommendation group), AG? (advisory group) then I think that’s a fantastic idea - but the overall goal should always be to decrease the governance burden.
Furthermore, if you did want to setup an AG (Advisory Group) framework, it would be better to set it up such that it can work for advisory groups in multiple areas - not just RWA.
In general, having an AG framework seems like a good idea. The groups membership and goals will be publicly known, there wouldn’t be any governance burden. Seems like a win-win. The DAO gets solid advice without having to concern itself with how these groups manage themselves.
As mentioned in this post I respectfully disagree with this logic. When making decisions, it’s important to know where the legitimacy lies. In this instance, MKR holders could make much more informed and precise decisions around the overall RWA concept by controlling the inputs (individuals) that determine the output votes of the committee. This legitimacy of input will increase the legitimacy of the outputs - I feel as though that much is undeniable and therefore it is a worthy reason to use a MIP.
I just completely disagree with this. There is no such implication.
Since the committee doesn’t have any crucial operating responsibilities, the MKR holders are able to completely ignore it after it is up and running if they are over-burdened. I think that once delegates are in place, governance burden will not be as much of an issue, but even so I think this is a worthy trade-off to add to the MKR holder’s plates. Either way, it’s up to them to decide if they want to take it on by voting for or against this MIP.
This part I agree with and I’d like to do it, if you could assist me in structuring the applications correctly (without compromising this MIPs inclusion in the next governance cycle it’s able to be included in).