Monetsupply Delegate Platform

Key Info

Name: monetsupply

Delegate Address: monetsupply.eth - 0x8d07D225a769b7Af3A923481E1FdF49180e6A265

Forum: @monet-supply

Rocketchat: @monetsupply

External Website:

Core Values

  • Expand DAI supply and market share
  • Build bridges between Maker and other protocol communities
  • Minimize risk of DAI holder losses

Delegate Statement

My perspective as a potential MakerDAO delegate is driven by the core values outlined above. I’ll try to break them down here to give insight into my future decision making.

Expanding DAI supply and market share - I firmly believe that Maker can’t be financially sustainable at its current scale. We’ll need a substantially larger DAI supply before we can cover our fixed costs and reach a point of positive unit economics. With this in mind, I’m ok to invest into growing our supply and market share even if this leads to negative cashflow in the short to medium term. I see Maker sort of like Amazon or other platform economy companies in the early 2000s - we should be comfortable investing in growth even if this requires raising capital or selling MKR, because this is what will allow us to become financially self-sustainable in the future. That being said, we need to stay focused on cost control so we can reach this crossover point as soon as possible.

Building bridges between Maker and other communities - Beyond competing on price, Maker also competes with other lending or stablecoin offerings based on relationships and narratives. We should focus on building strong ties with other communities, so they can feel invested in our success and have the confidence to incorporate DAI as a key part of their protocol. This goes beyond token listings, and could include co-sponsored grants, self regulatory organizations, or other shared initiatives to drive the space forward.

Minimize risk of DAI holder losses - In my view this is the most important responsibility of the Maker protocol. We offer the safest stablecoin available today, with diversification of collateral, sound governance, and a credible risk backstop from MKR holders. This gives us a huge benefit where people are willing to hold DAI without any intrinsic subsidy from MakerDAO (such as the DSR, which is currently at a nominal 0.01%). Maintaining this focus on safety is not only the right thing to do for users, but also benefits our economics (greater net interest margin for any given stability fee we charge) and regulatory positioning (a safe and sound system is less concerning to prudential regulators). Decisions that benefit MKR holders at the expense of DAI holders are likely to be self defeating over a long enough timeframe.

Conflicts of Interest

I hold financial stakes in a broad range of tokens and crypto assets. Most holdings are in my public ENS account monetsupply.eth. I also hold small amounts of BTC plus assets from Cosmos, Polkadot, and Solana ecosystems. Holdings include Maker protocol competitors such as COMP and AAVE.

I have made investments in certain projects / companies on terms not available to the public. This includes:

  • 10 ETH investment into LidoDAO LDO tokens (terms posted publicly here)
  • Investment of less than $10,000 into Rabbithole (private funding round)
  • Employee stock package from Tally

I’m a core contributor to the Risk Core Unit, and receive income from MakerDAO in this capacity. I also receive employment income from Tally. In the future, I may take part time / contracting work with Aave as part of their proposed risk team.

I’m a reviewer on the Compound and Uniswap grant program committees. Uniswap is planning to begin compensating committee members for their time, so I may receive income from Uniswap Grants in the future.

I participate in several governance protocols beyond MakerDAO. Most of my protocol activity can be seen on Tally here. My voting power currently exceeds the proposal thresholds for Uniswap and Compound governance.

I will make best efforts to update this disclosure statement when there are any material changes. Furthermore, I’ll recuse myself from participation in any cases where I feel I’m unable to make an unbiased decision.

I have read and agree to the Delegate Code of Conduct.

Waiver of liability

By delegating to me, you acknowledge and agree that I participate on a best efforts basis and will not be liable for any form of damages related to my participation in the Maker Protocol or MakerDAO.


Thank you for applying. Always a big fan of your community and governance support :+1:

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Thank you for applying. I share your core values, and your broad experience within the DeFi community is a key asset in seeing them realized.

Monetsupply is probably one of the most trustworthy individuals in the entire maker community, but i am truly terrified of the precedent that vote delegates can also be financially affiliated with core units that extract funding out of maker, and where voting is supposed to be what keeps them in check. Monetsupply obviously wouldn’t abuse this, but he would open the door for others to do the same kind of role stacking… and most of them will not be as trustworthy.


This is a good point. I believe the current position is that core unit facilitators should not be recognized delegates, but other members are permitted to become delegates. That being said, I think it’s reasonable for me to abstain from Risk Core Unit related proposals (such as this budget proposal) in the polling stage. This gives opponents an opportunity to block Risk related proposals without needing to overcome my voting power. I will still plan to vote in most or all executive votes (even those including risk core unit budget amendments or monthly budget payments) to ensure timely execution and governance security.

I’m open to feedback or comments on this plan to abstain from Risk Core Unit related polling votes :slight_smile: I think the most important safeguard is voters’ ability to withdraw their support if they believe their delegate is engaged in self-dealing.


I think if you have constituents who specifically want their portion of MKR voted a certain way, and are willing to disclose that to GovAlpha or other approved referees, then you should not let your position remove your constituents’ voice on that matter.

I’m not sure what we would do for constituents that wanted opposing positions on a poll you were personally recused from, though. I suppose just vote the net position. Except in cases of meeting minimum threshold, that should work.

Anyway, that’s my suggestion. A bit of a headache, but we don’t want to force abstention on a specific issue for your constituents

But abstention doesn’t really solve the problem. Voting is politics and in any political system there’s an implied or overt practice of vote trading. Basically if you were a delegate, we would need to trust you to act against your incentive. This is something I wouldn’t trust anyone to do, as I believe incentives always win (subliminally or consciously).


IMO the optimal solution is to simply pay monetsupply for his work as a delegate (and all other top delegates, which im assuming monetsupply will be, considering his track record in other communities).

Paying the delegates a good compensation for the work they do will absolutely be worth the cost and come back 10 fold to the DAO as it means the DAO has greater certainty that they will be truly independent from the core units, and sincerely represent the DAOs interests without compromise when negotiating with the core units and keeping them in check.


But he is working for a core unit, so how can he get paid to represent the DAO and the core unit’s interest equally in an unbiased manner? Seems impossible.

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In my view, delegates’ responsibility is to share their perspective and expected voting behavior transparently, and then vote owners are responsible for selecting a delegate that aligns with their preferences. So if a vote owner wants to be sure that their delegate would participate in all polls involving the risk core unit, they shouldn’t delegate to me.

I will listen to and value constituent feedback, but will not be taking directions from delegators. So I’m not so concerned with what my delegators want specifically, more with what in my view is best for the Maker Protocol and MakerDAO. If there is disagreement, I believe it is the vote owners’ responsibility to re-delegating their tokens, rather than delegates’ responsibility to follow their wishes.

I see your point, but disagree with the conclusion. I have a lot more interest in maintaining/building my professional reputation versus extracting value via my work with the risk core unit.

I feel my role with risk is primarily meant to represent the DAO’s interests :slight_smile: on certain budget matters there may be conflicting incentives but I feel that this is manageable through abstention as outlined above.

This discussion feels like a good jumping off point for addressing the core unit contributor / vote delegate question more concretely. If the community is uncomfortable with people serving as both contributor and recognized delegate, this can be disallowed. But what would be the recourse if someone both works with a core unit and is an unrecognized delegate? Are there benefits to having contributors serve as delegates (eg maybe deeper understanding of challenges and opportunities, etc) that could outweigh the risks?

Happy to abandon this if it’s too controversial. But I do feel we may be relying too much on subjective assessments and standards rather than vote owners’ economic incentives (which I think is the fundamental basis of good governance and security).


I agree with MS. Our overt focus on economic edge cases ignores two important (if not critical) points: (i) the reputational risk MS runs by acting to solely extract value as a delegate and CU member, and (ii) the simple fact that one may retract his or her MKR from MS at the earliest sign of any issue. So long as we are aware of the potential conflict of interest, voters are informed and can decide appropriately how to manage their individual MKR holdings. And FWIW, I do not see MS discarding the reputation he has built here and elsewhere in DeFi to squeeze out some extra Dai as a delegate.

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You are correct in that we cannot actually prevent a core unit member from being a delegate, but it makes for bad optics which is why it should be avoided. I look at the division of vote delegates and core units as the division of the public sector and private sector. Can a politician pass laws that have nothing to do with the business he runs sure, but it makes for really bad optics if something goes wrong.