[OHM] - OLYMPUS DAO Collateral Onboarding Application (MIP6)

disclaimer: I invest in OHM

I think under the right parameters using OHM as collateral could be a good idea.

My only reservation is that not all the OHM contracts are multisig and the platform as a whole I think can use more security audits. Taggging Zeus because he would know @ohmzeus.

I think we should address the multisig issue before onboarding OHM as collateral since that might require contract changes.

Again don’t know much so tagging Zeus to explain, but fairly sure there something that happened that made one of the contracts non-multisig. Doesn’t affect treasury as far as I know, but my understanding is that if the single key were compromised it could be used in an exploit which is bad.

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Disclosure: I’m not affiliated with the OlympusDAO project, but I do hold a significant amount of staked OHM.

This is in regards to the OHM ERC-20 contract itself. I’ll just copy a few of my own messages from the OlympusDAO server that I posted when I noticed this during my own review of the contracts:

Original message

I really don’t want to be annoying but I think the issue I previously raised with ownership of the OHM ERC-20 contract (0x383518188C0C6d7730D91b2c03a03C837814a899) is more severe than I really conveyed. Since its owner (0x763A641383007870ae96067818f1649E5586f6DE) is a single key (not a multisig), if this single key is compromised, it can call setVault to an address it controls to be able call mint (which is behind an onlyVault guard) to mint as much OHM as it wants to any address as the recipient.

It would probably be a very good idea to update the owner of the OHM contract to one of the dev-controlled multisigs (like 0x245cc372C84B3645Bf0Ffe6538620B04a217988B which controls the treasury) very soon.

Alternately, the owner of this contract could be set to the null address which would mitigate this, but it would be come impossible to call setVault if the vault needed to be migrated to a new contract for some reason

Message #2

The risk is stated in my original message, but to summarise:

  • The treasury itself is a lot safer, it is controlled by a developer multisig, as detailed in the docs (and I confirmed that this is the case on chain too)

  • The sOHM contract is controlled by a single key, but the damage it can cause if compromised is limited, largely limited to messing up the index in rebase events logged which will make analytics harder, but as far as I can tell, the index value in this contract is purely informational, it’s not used by the actual rebase calculations

  • The OHM contract is controlled by a single key (different from the one that controls sOHM). If compromised, setOwner can be called to update the owner to another address, and to call setVault to change the treasury contract address to an address the attacker controls. The main point of concern here is the address set as vault in the OHM contract is able to call mint to create new OHM and assign them to any address of it’s choosing. Were this key compromised it could not steal treasury funds or token balances, but it could dilute the OHM supply outside the defined parameters

The follow on from this, is since an attacker could mint OHM for free, they could use this free OHM to crash the price and drain any LP pairs containing OHM.

This means the LP tokens in the treasury could be devalued, but the dai, frax & weth in treasury are still safe in this scenario

The response I received to this is that the key in question was irretrievably lost (faulty hardware wallet without backup) and that there would be a migration to a new token contract at some point in the future, as any methods beyond an onlyOwner guard on the current contract can no longer be called, if the key in question is truly lost.

Regarding the treasury itself

As per the documentation, the treasury is currently under the control of a four-of-seven developer multisig (a Gnosis Safe instance). As such, the project is not currently trustless - the developers retain a privileged position until such a point where the project migrates to on-chain governance.

I personally feel the risk of malicious actions to be extremely low, in large part due to all the efforts to integrate with other projects and to build relationships & partnerships in the wider defi ecosystem. These are not actions I would expect a project intending to rug pull or otherwise scam to undertake.


Just want to repeat this for emphasis :point_up:

A lot of negativity in this thread from newly registered users. Don’t mistake them for the MakerDAO crowd.


negativity because its 3% backed and wants to be collateral, and the backing is collectively cornering small caps, result is inevitable pump backed by its own liquidity, its false numbers, its a ‘buy my bags’ smart contract to pump external projects, all the dai here will go into MIM CRV vault and will be vaulted by yearn, then people leverage the minted dai into Mai to keep the peg when they leverage up their Mai vaults, lets recreate the conventional finance leverage pyramid, maybe then we can next time collapse in a real 2008 fashion


This is unfortunate because there’s no way to verify a key is permanently lost and no recoverable copies exist. Until contract is migrated there would always be black swan risk of the key being compromised leading to infinite minting.


Lets start with some basics.

  1. Admin key ‘lost’. Honestly this is a key sticking point. Get off that contract. Don’t care what anyone says 1 key here and the entire system compromised. This one point alone is sufficient to deny this MIP6 application.
  2. Oracles going to be a key issue. I don’t see how this is overcome in the short term.

I actually looked over the documentation linked here.

Some interesting quotes to take into account the realities of this.

  1. " OHM is backed, not pegged.

Each OHM is backed by 1 DAI, not pegged to it. Because the treasury backs every OHM with at least 1 DAI, the protocol would buy back and burn OHM when it trades below 1 DAI. This has the effect of pushing OHM price back up to 1 DAI. OHM could always trade above 1 DAI because there is no upper limit imposed by the protocol. Think pegged == 1, while backed >= 1.

You might say that the OHM floor price or intrinsic value is 1 DAI. We believe that the actual price will always be 1 DAI + premium, but in the end that is up to the market to decide."

Hence by definition the system is ‘capturing’ value when OHM is > 1 anyone who buys OHM above 1DAI in price is basically giving their money away to the system.

  1. OHM to pay out its high rewards is a rebasing token. So for each 1% you think you earn by the rebase the price in the LPs is dropping. So far money is moving in filling the coffers, LPs and causing postiive rebases. Just look at the reasons for buying and the whole return statements in the document. 2%/day APY and up to 100000% APYs - seriously folks this is the new monetary policy that you want the world to be based on?

  2. Lets forget about every other asset in this system and just look at using DAI to back OHM 1:1 - if you thought about this system from just being one kind of stablecoin OMH being backed by another stablecoin DAI - you’d just say this is a rehypothication of DAI to OHM.

Ask yourself what is the product being offered here.

The document has the answer:

" Is OHM a stable coin?

No, OHM is not a stable coin. Rather, OHM aspires to become an algorithmic reserve currency backed by other decentralized assets. Similar to the idea of the gold standard, OHM provides free floating value its users can always fall back on, simply because of the fractional treasury reserves OHM draws its intrinsic value from."

‘fractional treasury reserves’ and no it isn’t a stablecoin because unlike DAI and Maker that did not seek to profit from DAI PEG running high (which we do to some extent with PSM tin/tout but not to the extend OHM is doing) we try to keep the PEG at 1+/-tin/tout this protocol seeks to profit from this price disparity. BTW: This whole 1OHM = 1DAI idea flies flat in the face of another statement made in that document.

" Dollar-pegged stablecoins have become an essential part of crypto due to their lack of volatility as compared to tokens such as Bitcoin and Ether. Users are comfortable with transacting using stablecoins knowing that they hold the same amount of purchasing power today vs. tomorrow. But this is a fallacy. The dollar is controlled by the US government and the Federal Reserve. This means a depreciation of dollar also means a depreciation of these stablecoins.

OlympusDAO aims to solve this by creating a free-floating reserve currency, OHM, that is backed by a basket of assets. By focusing on supply growth rather than price appreciation, OlympusDAO hopes that OHM can function as a currency that is able to hold its purchasing power regardless of market volatility"

Yet as quoted OHM is backed by 1 DAI + ‘something’ which related to a staking, bonding model of behavior that is supposed to manage value accrual to the system beyond 1DAI per OHM.

The big argument for OHM is that Bitcoin and ETH basically are backed by ‘nothing’ so hell why not OHM.

Maker stands in stark contrast to this and other models by being fully liquid in the collateral, and DAI backing value is overcollateralized. Maker offers clients the ability to borrow a token that yes trades with $1US value (I know there probably were a lot of debates why this value was chosen and not some other defining value basket and defer this argument for another thread) but is fully backed by collateral value exceeding the DAI notional value in $$. This system is not fully backed especially at these 20x book valuations.

What I see this OHM system doing is presenting the user with massive returns, to get them to buy OHM at prices far over what the backing value is at the time, so the system can bank some of this value difference which is only going to buy back the tokens when the OHM value drops below 1DAI. This is straight up a hype value sink designed to trap people high and exit them low.

Not one single person in their right mind should pay more than 1DAI/OHM and if I were to add if Maker decides to onboard OHM it should basically treat it as a stablecoin. 1.2OHM can maybe borrow 1DAI because that is what the actual OHM system says the intrinsic value is, in fact that system is designed to move that value eventually to that 1OHM = 1DAI + ‘this not so defined’ something. Right now you could basically look to buy OHM at or below book value and maybe try to play a speculative game but in the end the way this system is constructed is that if you are paying more than 1 DAI per OHM you will eventually find yourself diluted so that eventually 1OHM is basically worth 1DAI. Now will the rebasing returns you got actually offset the OHM reduction in value. Depends on when you bought and whether the system is still getting inflows or outflows.

Ultimately the individuals earning the maximum value are the early stakers while as time goes on there will be less and less pie to share and the OHM price will start dropping. Look at the parabolic rise in those charts at some point all liquidity would run out and the fuel to sustain the growth and hence the returns is going to stop and this will lead to a supernova type collapse that the system is designed to handle,

BUT ONLY when the OHM price is below 1DAI/OHM.

So I am not going to say ponzi. I am going to say unsustainable by design. I am also going to say there are significant issues not to onboard OHM at a minimum that would need to be cleared up.

Also like @monet-supply suggests we can certainly onboard this and put a very high LR and even a higher LF to buffer the system here against losses. In the end I have another concern and this is regulatory.

I am not saying OHM is some illegal ponzi, but what if MakerDAO didn’t see through an addition that basically rug pulled using DAI and trapped a whole bunch of people in something. I can see such an event would be like a light to the regulator mosquito - urging them to bite us.

I have often had this concern about what happens if a blacklisted address were to drop wBTC or ETH into the protocol and mint DAI. As far as I know Maker can’t do one thing about this and in this sense Maker becomes complicit in criminal activities and brings the protocol under huge scrutiny. It is why when we weigh collateral additions via MIP6 the community and DAO has to have significant scrutiny.

One thing I have wanted to change with MIP6 proposals is that at least one CU should have to co-sponsor them. This way we have some accountability and control within the protocol CU structure over what proposals are even submitted and these create a lot of churn and discussion eating up valuable community productivity. I want to see these but I also want to know at least one CU is in favor of them because they are good additions already basically vetted by at least one person in the protocol before put up for consideration by the community.


Something people should consider is the ethics behind them controlling their own liquidity, with over 92% staked. Since the value accrual is happening, at the new user’s expense, is it even ethical for the premium in the first place? People making a bet this is going to 20X to match book, is a scary proposition. Ultimately, it’s just a liquidity drain until the tokenomics from a growth plateau kick in, and what happens to the rest of the market, when it’s a 40 billion dollar monster and the liquidity begins to flow again?

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Have to be frank here… All of this astro turfed back and forth re OHM by new accounts seems a thinly veiled attempt to build some narrative about “Maker being against DeFi” (which is ridiculous). FWIW, I like OHM, am a fan of Zeus and am in the project’s Discord but I don’t get where all of this whipped up faux aggression comes from, unless, as I surmise, it’s a silly internet game played by people trying to “score points” on crypto twitter.

/rant done


Agreed, there is no way to prove they key is lost, and it remains a risk that cannot be mitigated until the relevant contracts are replaced.

I’m still comfortable enough with the funds I have in OlympusDAO, but I can understand how this risk may impede potential partnerships.


Yeah same thoughts here. I would be more comfortable with OHM if they would fix known exploits even if the risk is low. I think it would make more sense to update the contracts to be safer before listing on Maker and other protocols.

Again, fully support the Olympus project, but I need to be 100% honest in saying that all known vulnerabilities should be fixed immediately. We’re talking about hundreds of millions of dollars invested in OHM so it’s not okay to leave this hanging for a long time. It needs to be patched ASAP.


You make a good argument.
On the other hand you simply analyze 1 single aspect of the docs the Dai 1 to 1 backing.

Skipping thru RFV and Runaway
As well as the Bonds and Bonds as a service amongst many many others.

You also don’t mention huge amounts of revenue being created by the deployment of their treasury in white listed protocols like AAVE, CVX , SUSHI, and recently Compound being added as well with many more in the works.

So although you make good points your analysis is very basic imo and misleading to say the least. It’s quite flawed tbh.

I’m an investor in Olympus DAO And have spent hundreds of hours learning about their protocol. There so is much you missed that it was even a waste of my time reading it.

Lastly i think Maker should wait as i find inadmissible some of the other issues and at the very least a migration should be made amongst other things before Maker reconsider onboarding Olympus.


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OHM is one of the most fascinating projects in crypto. Their docs have a lot of confusing language. Lets break that down so we can analyze what risks OHM poses to Maker Dao.

You may have seen the (3,3) which is a reference to Olympus Dao’s game theory. It states that if I don’t sell and you don’t sell then we both will benefit. There’s a special name for this type of game and it is called the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma shows why two rational people may not cooperate. Olympus has managed, so far, to keep everyone cooperating. They initially accomplished this by limiting the first tokens to their discord community. They continue to accomplish this with the (3,3) peer-pressure campaign and the promise of massive staking APYs.

What is Olympus Dao’s product? Originally there wasn’t one. Oympus sells OHM with the promise that buyers can stake OHM for huge APYs. Where did the APY come from? It comes from the money new investors put into the protocol when they buy new tokens. Some people call this a ponzi scheme, but there’s nothing clandestine, Olympus Dao is perfectly transparent about what they are doing. Olympus likes to claim the OHM they sell as revenue which is exciting because revenue comes from selling products. But selling new equity in your company is not revenue, its equity, and its dilution.

Olympus aspires to be the reserve currency of crypto. It reminds me of another popular reserve currency – the US Dollar. The Olympus treasury and dao are controlled by a 4 of 7 multisig, kind of a like a federal reserve vote. OHM has no supply cap and new supply is currently hyperinflationary. I thought we all got into crypto for the decentralization and sound money, is this some sort of sick joke?

Olympus recently launched OlympusPro. OlympusPro is a real product with audited and tested smart contracts. It is exciting and other projects are using it. Olympus managed to bootstrap themselves for several months on nothing but promises. They’ve released their first real product and hopefully they can deliver or its only a matter of time before the prisoners kill each other.

Recommendation – Do not accept OHM as collateral on Maker Dao. Wait for the project to become decentralized, their OlympusPro product to mature, and their inflation to taper.


Proof of Treasury vs Proof of Work.

Bitcoin is produced by spending electricity.
OHM is produced by spending 1 token worth of risk free value tokens and assets, currently denominated as 1 USD; on treasury bonds.

Bitcoin supply is increased by more nodes joining the network.
OHM supply is increased by more users purchasing bonds.

Bitcoin spreads risk of a double-spend attack by distribution of nodes.
OHM spreads risk of Treasury collapse by diversification of assets onboarded.

Bitcoin supply is programmatically capped at 2.1 quadrillion satoshi units.
OHM supply is uncapped.

Bitcoin supply inflation is controlled by halvening events every 4 years, and HODL meme.
OHM supply inflation is controlled by APY reduction as its supply increases, and (3,3) gaming system.

Bitcoin price floor is zero.
OHM price floor is 1 token worth of risk free value, currently denominated as 1 USD.

Bitcoin intrinsic value is 0.
OHM intrinsic value is 1 token worth of risk free value, currently denominated as 1 USD.

Bitcoin price ceiling is limited to all the global broad money supply in circulation and set by the free market.
OHM price ceiling is limited to all the global broad money supply in circulation and set by the free market.

Bitcoin protocol was created by a pseudo-anon person/team who we can’t communicate with.
OHM was created by a pseudo-anon person/team who we can still communicate with.

Bitcoin creator controls at least 1 million of Bitcoin that we trust they won’t suddenly release into the economy.
OHM creator says admin key is lost, which we trust by the continued transparency of the team.

The question you should ask yourself is:

Would you add Bitcoin to the MakerDAO treasury?

If yes - then why not OHM?

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It’s not dilution - if you stake, your “company equity” (to use your analogy) is not diluted, but rather grows in value with the company.

If you don’t stake you get diluted.

Like many new projects - there are multi-sigs acting as an “escape hatch”, until the project is robust enough for sigs to be burned and project let loose to run.

Olympus is no different. Despite its phenomenal growth in such a short space of time, it is still new with potentially many unseen variables that might impact it.

But as time goes on and the protocol is proven it is natural for any DeFi project to extend its tentacles and seek partnerships in the meritocracy of decentralized finance.

Supply is far from hyperinflationary but rather, is controlled by OIP-18 (OIP-18: Reward rate framework and reduction - OlympusDAOForum) which was voted on by all OHM holders (that wanted a say in its governance).

I find it very concerning to see this. I expected a response that said the person you are replying to was mistaken.

Based on that link I think you might have different views on what constitutes hyperinflation.

It’s an interesting project, I will definitely agree with that!


Seems like it will be possible to liquidate $100m OHM with around 50% slippage. This should allow for vaults with 200% liquidation ratio. May be make it 300% so that there is a buffer.

The nice thing about OHM is that this liquidity is owned by the protocol and in case of a bank run, it will stay there and be available to everyone.

It really sounds crazy at first, but OHM might be a very interesting collateral to add.

On Rari, Tetranode’s Locker has 76% LTV on sOHM. sOHM is staked OHM which earns yield which can be levered up on via Rari. Even though the APYs are very high for Ohmies borrowing stables (30-50% range), it’s still very attractive because they’re essentially arbing the sOHM yield. While a higher collateralization ratio for OHM makes sense from the interest of the Maker Protocol, there wouldn’t be any usage because the capital efficiency is better on Rari.


Personally, although I have nothing against Olympus I do not think that accepting OHM as a collateral would be a good idea, and for a simple reason I will explain below.

If we take the market value of Olympus’ treasury, OHM market cap is 5x levered over treasury (was 7x until yesterday), and probably 25x if we exclude amounts in the liquidity pools, so let’s say it’s somewhere in between.

I think DAI represents 70-80% of that treasury.

What that means, de facto, is that OHM is a levered play on the DAI by a factor of c. 10-20x. DAI, itself, is a currency backed by a certain amount of diversified collateral with a certain measure of (over)collateralisation. By using OHM as a collateral, DAI would amplify the implied leverage of its balance sheet in a way that Maker cannot control, leaving to others the ability to impact its economic policy and making in general such balance sheet more levered/ riskier.

I don’t think that doing that is a good idea. But I would be open to be convinced otherwise.


I’m not convinced this is true. A bunch of people using the fuse pools are leveraging up, but I imagine there’s also many people who would be interested to get some liquidity out of their OHM without selling - eg for personal expenses or purchases. Depending on jurisdiction, there could be significant tax advantages to borrowing funds from MakerDAO versus selling a portion of their holdings. So for these users, minting DAI with lower rates and a higher collateral ratio could be a good deal even if Fuse offers a higher leverage / lower collateral ratio option.

On another note, Olympus just published this update on v2:

This upgrade looks like it includes on chain governance of treasury assets and bond mechanism, along with migration to new contracts to remediate security risks of OHM v1. I think this would help with the case for onboarding when these updates are in place.


I don’t think this makes sense, even if the collateral ratio is higher on Tetra’s pool doesn’t mean maker’s would see no usage. There would surely be interest in borrowing for lower interest rates ( given it’s lower than Tetranode’s usual 40-50%) or to take advantage of the more forgiving oracle delays. Or other stuff like perceived safety of using Maker vs Fuse.