So I’m a bit confused by the various hesitations around raising the ETH-A debt ceiling so that we do not need urgency executives every two weeks. The last time I asked about this, it seemed to me that the ultimate goal of Maker is to maintain the DAI peg, I supposed in such a way that users trust this asset, in turn increasing the demand for it and the cashflow generated.
I see some people in this thread pointing to the risk of liquidation as a an argument against raising the DC. Why is that? In what way do liquidations impact the peg? In what way do liquidations impact the security of the overall system? It seems to me that this risk is segregated on a per vault basis and only concerns the vault owners, not the Maker system as a whole.
In that context, and as I was saying in the thread linked above, I am under the impression that the DC should always be increased when the cap is about to be reached, and that there should in fact always be a comfortable margin, except if the value of DAI below $1, at which point there is a need to make people unwind their vaults by increasing the SF, thus allowing for a reduction of the DC. Indeed, why would we artificially limit the amount of debt generated by not moving the ceiling appropriately and raising the fees, as long as the peg is maintained?