I like this suggestion and think this, or something like it that reduces bureaucratic overhead, would be great. However in hindsight I think the real solution would have been to make an urgent signal request right when we saw the new reality that we’d need to adjust to, and the damage it would cause us to not adapt in time.
It’s probably not possible to create a process that is both robust and low risk during routine operations, and also able to handle exceptions and critical edge cases with high flexibility. The better solution is to escalate and use special processes, such as the urgent signal request, which are designed for emergencies and critical situations, when such a critical situation arises.
We are getting shredded right now btw. Defisaver is running a marketing campaign focused on migrating your collateral out of maker to liquity, probably because they can see there is so much demand for it, and maker is struggling to hang on to 3rd place on defipulse. We are bleeding users and need to urgently react. This is not the kind of situation where we should wait around for a lenghty process to play out, this is the kind of situation where we need to prioritize.
These are excellent points and a cause for concern. I’ve also seen a marketing campaign by Liquity-connected persons to pump up the positives of LUSD vis-a-vis Dai. Now would be a good opportunity for content production or marcomms (if there was one) to point out why LUSD is problematic for the typical user/borrower. I’m not that familiar with their platform but I believe their system permits users to redeem other people’s ETH…that strikes me as something that should be massively pointed out given Liquity’s noticeable reluctance to be frank about it.
Seems like we just underestimated Liquity’s competitiveness, I don’t think this is a systematic issue with our governance process. Good for them, by the way. Now let’s show the world that we’ve still got some fight in us.
My recommendation is to take the origination fee in Liquity (I think it’s 0.5%?) into an annualized rate over the median loan of those that have migrated (will take a bit of on-chain research) and then lower our ETH rate below that number.
Hey @alexis, I’m going to restart the poll here with the correct settings and more neutral options. To summarize the issues are the following:
No ‘abstain’ option.
Closing date is fixed.
Poll options are not worded in a neutral manner.
I would also encourage you to make changes to the ‘Next Steps’ section.
Add a date for the signal poll to end.
Think more carefully about the next steps.
The next steps here are kind of important, because the way PPG’s work is defined in MIP46. The relevant sections are probably:
Discussion - Parameter Proposals must be presented with enough of a feedback period to give the community time to respond and discuss the proposal. Questions, concerns, or queries must be answered if brought up by the Maker community, and feedback must be considered before finalizing the proposal.
Parameter Proposals are first presented on the Maker Governance forum and are then entered into the weekly governance cycle by the Governance Facilitators. Where possible, Parameter Proposals should be made public on the first Monday of the month for inclusion into the weekly cycle in the second week of the month.
Sufficient time must be given for discussion, and inclusion in the weekly cycle may be delayed by the Governance Facilitators if they feel more discussion is required.
Proposed Parameter Changes will be bundled into a single on-chain poll for inclusion in the weekly cycle, and if the outcome is favorable, will proceed to that week’s executive vote absent unforeseen circumstances.
Urgent or emergency proposals from Parameter Proposal Groups should follow the existing guidelines for urgent or emergency proposals.
Changes to the process for PPG’s would require modification to this MIP. I would suggest that if this signal ends successfully, the next step would pursue an amendment to MIP46.
So with that out of the way, let me come to the actual contents here.
Generally those in the group agree that it’s taking too long. But lets be specific about the timing and what causes the delays, the current situation is:
5-7 days - forum debate
3 days - polling
1 days - gap between poll and executive
1-5 days - Executive time-to-pass
2 days - GSM Delay
0-3 days - Office hours
All told this comes to: 12 days - 21 days
Now, we have a few options here, lets start by cutting the debate time to 1 day (which is about the minimum notice we need to put something up for polling.) We get to: 7 days - 15 days
And finally if we want to go the whole way we can skip straight to executive (again 1 day is the minimum notice for us to put it in the executive), which gets us to: 4 days - 11 days
Both of these changes would improve the timing to some extent, but lets not kid ourselves that it gives us an instant response time. Much of the delay is down to the speed with which MKR Holders (or in the future, delegates) vote on the executive.
Frankly, this is a bad idea from a governance perspective, for a couple of reasons:
PPG’s are not elected, anyone can create one and make proposals. Skipping directly to executive means giving anyone who wants it permission to add arbitrary parameter changes to any executive vote.
Having multiple executives active at the same time is dangerous. MKR gets split between them and it lowers the threshold of MKR required for a governance attack.
If governance does want to further empower PPG’s I would recommend removing the required discussion time prior to the poll. This would save us 4-6 days in the process. I would remind everyone though, that this change would apply to all PPG’s present and future, regardless of membership.
I would agree with the above.
This is more or less the correct answer. Internally the group did discuss taking action prior to the usual time. In actuality, the group did make it’s proposal 1 week earlier than was scheduled. In retrospect, we could and should have moved it up an additional week - and in the future we’ll be more responsive. However, the issue here is that it’s more or less impossible to know if a market movement will be sustained or reversed as it happens.
In retrospect using the urgent signal process would also have been a valid option, and we’ll consider using that more liberally in the future.
Following your comments, effectively this seems a better solution.
The discussion time prior to the poll won’t change the parameters or the decision. In any case the parameters change will go into the poll. As it is a recurrent event either we thrust or we dissolve the committee.
I have to strongly oppose further shortening the time frame for this group — which is was not empowered by MKR holders.
As it is, the most recent proposals have found their way into an executive after a poll — posted quietly with no other polls of the same date, and without even an attempt to vote on the forum — already violated MIP46 by skipping the discussion and feedback period.
If anything, we need to lengthen the time it takes for a small group of individuals to decide behind closed doors to alter the expected revenue of Maker by tens of millions of DAI.
Does Maker stand for decentralization? Decentralization involves openness, transparency, and due process. It does not involve the power to cut rates in half being held in the hands of an elite few, rushed into polling the very day it is proposed — proof that no discussion was necessary in minds of those proposing it. Never was there even an informal poll to see if pushing Maker onto a money losing path was worthy of debate.
I ask again, is Maker for decentralization? There is no space for even further empowering small, self-appointed groups who do not even feel compelled to comply with the very MIP their group was formed under.
Vote no. The process is already too closed and too rushed, with power to swing Maker between profits and loss vested in the hands of a few.
I know reading is for suckers, but please… MIP 46 formalizes the former “Rates Group”.
There is no need to empower MOMC, the parameter changes proposed by the PPGs are getting voted on in onchain polls. Despite some serious pushback in the forum thread of the last proposal the onchain poll got almost no “No” votes. Might just be the case that participants with skin in the game just feel different than the offchain community? idk, just speculating.
I would assume it is more a thing of govalpha to “revoke” a PPG. However, If you don’t like the proposals of the MOMC go ahead and create your own PPG.
(4) Bring irrelevant issues as frequently as possible
(6) Refer back to matters decided upon at the last meeting and attempt to re-open the question of the advisability of that decision.
(8) Be worried about the propriety of any decision - raise the question of whether such action as is contemplates lies within the jurisdiction of the group or whether it might conflict with the policy of some higher echolon.
If MOMC overshoot with the rates it will just overboost DAI supply (resulting in some PSM drain, wouldn’t that be great!?) and we can increase slowly (!) the rates and be happy about earning more money while having more DAI in circulation.