I have not had time to complete my analysis so it is difficult to say anything without looking at wallet participation here.
My impression is that we are getting more consistent voting from delegates but the issue is MKR is leaving governance generally.
I still want to do an analysis but I am rapidly coming to a general conclusion that if Maker wants governance participation then it should seriously consider rewarding with either DAI equivalent of MKR or MKR directly to the tune of .1% of the existing MC. This reward should be across the board for all MKR voting and to facilitate delegation for people who have a small amount of MKR something like a 50% pass through reward for delegates 50% to the delegator. These rewards would be based on poll and executive vote participation.
I honestly don’t see any other solution that aligns interests punishing MKR holders that are not participating in governance, and rewarding those who do consistently participate. Rewards have to be linear because the guard of the hat is a linear MKR function. Doing anything like quadratic rewards here just punishes large MKR holders.
Taking existing governance data and running it through my own analysis to produce what I call a ‘wallet_importance’ metric (separated poll and executives) so the rewards can be weighted appropriately i think is important.
Also I don’t know if anyone has reviewed a chart of MKR in governance since inception but the graph seb has only goes back to 1/1/2021. Go back further and we see governance late in 2020 had 350K MKR in it. Sebs chart has more up to date data indicating further MKR leaving governance which confirms a general downtrend in MKR in governance.
Apologies for the lack of labels here - this was just a first pass on the data for a quick look at how much MKR had in governance from inception till now before I sat and finished my data restructuring to be able to calculate my wallet_importance metrics and to analyze all wallets over all time behaviors in governance.
I just found it particularly interesting that MKR in governance continued to grow up until the end of 2020. An interesting correlative analysis would be of the wallets holding MKR over time as well but that is for another analytical pass.
The chart I have is not up to date but you can see @SebVentures chart within mine for 2021.
I think since this whole delegate compensation thing, and governance participation is rising in importance I am going to priortize my analytic work to see if I can get some basic form of my own GovAlpha report out within next 2-4 weeks. My own basic analysis of the situation is that there is a proper alignment of governance interests if rewards that dilute all MKR holders to compensate governance participation via some defined participation metric. Making it so small players can delegate their MKR to one delegate and get the participation performance of the delegate via a ~50% reward pass through actually can help bring in smaller players to delegation. BTW: rewards can vest and either MKR sold to compensate in DAI or MKR simply paid out. .1% of entire float is approx 1000MKR which corresponds to 2.5M/yr to compensate ALL MKR either voting or delegating to vote. This is not a huge number and the pass through via MKR delgated to delegates as ‘their pay’ (which can have an additional adjustment component via some moderate delegate compensation along the lines of the first MIP) isn’t unreasonable.
The issue is that MKR in governance in the past has not been willing to dilute itself even to compensate itself for voting. I think the idea of rewarding governance participation with a component linear to MKR being voted multipled by a performance factor between 0 and 1 with a weighting component for polls and executives is probably the fairest and best model to encourage governance participation. .1% (or 1000MKR equivalent in value) is cheap to get people in here voting. with 1/2 of the delegate capture going to delegate compensation potentially a great way to get smaller MKR holders to delegate and earn some return protecting the system via their favorite delegates.