As has been said before, 0% is offensive. Compensation has already been agreed and there should not even be an option to revert this.
18% compensation examples seem clear and fair to me, although obviously as a vault owner I would prefer the max theoretical
Of course I understand the need to pay the developing staff for implementation but this should not be another barrier to completion. These are your “own” people as it were and it should be relatively easy to get this part approved separately.
Really like to see progress, thanks to the team involved.
I realize the large maker holders have a much better understanding of all stuff that can go wrong when a cdp get close to 150%. Dai peg get lost, slow transactions, not enough liquidity etc. At the same time, vault owners are shown this reasonable 13% penalty when they get in.
I would like to see two things:
-Max compensation (why? This has taken too much time, ETH is already 4x from March, we might see ETH at 700 USD by the time of the actual compensation)
-More clear communication about risk of CDP’s on oasis website. Even today, new CDP holders get sucked in using an example of 200% CDP on oasis website and 13% liquidation fee…
I heard something on that call about if you select 24% it still won’t be 24% etc.
I think this needs to be iterated again to provide more clarity and is a supporting case for selecting a higher % threshold in the vote to ensure that the incentive is high enough for people to opt-out of the litigation case by accepting compensation.
For me personally as an effected stakeholder anywhere between 18%-24% would be an acceptable outcome.
I would not start calling it “deception”, as this would incline that it is done on purpose. I just see a big difference in knowledge between maker holders and users of the maker protocol. The maker holders have a responsibility towards the users as the users will make the protocol work. (that’s why my suggestion of improving the info about the risks, the 13% is just not clear for most users)
One of the reasons I opened a Vault is that I like the protocol and wanted to be involved in this interesting tech. If I get compensation in Maker tokens I and don’t get insulted by a ridiculous low percentage, I am planning to hold the tokens.
I’ll just echo the point on trust - this should not be just a technical thing. This issue will have a PR impact.
Then @makerman could we have an actual compensation percentage in brackets or something that makes it more intuitive for voting? Seems confusing from a voting pov (although I understand the technical argument) if you have to explain to every voter that the actual comp % is close to half to vault holders.
I’d like to second this. The compensation amounts need to be really clear to ensure that everyone knows what they are voting for. I think we’re definitely a lot closer to a viable plan, this is one of the only things I remain concerned about.
I believe the issue with the 0% compensation it the following:
-I understand the compensation team like to have clearity from the maker holders
The first reaction of maker holder after the 0 bid problem was to compensate the vault holder. This gave trust to the maker protocol. Several months later… most people forgot about the 0 bid problem and maker holders are happy to see that many new CDP’s have helped to increase the outstanding DAI.
So, I see some maker holders will vote for a 0% compensation, because they just want to forget about the zero bid problem and hope it will not get too much media attention. It just gives me a really ackward feeling and I would loose all trust in the way maker holders deal with their users.
My other concern is about the compensation percentage. As discussed before, due to technical reasons, direct compensation in ETH is very difficult, but I don;t see why the max compensation is now limited to about 50% ?
Having said all this, delaying the process is the last thing i like to see.
Self liquidation in a black swan event is what traders usually do. This is an active choice. I don`t see why there should be a compensation. Please tell me why the working group thinks of apples and oranges alike (or even worse).
“All vaults affected by suboptimal Maker/Ethereum performance are eligible for consideration, whether collateral was liquidated at zero or at some other level. Liquidated vaults that paid back debt or deposited additional collateral are also eligible. The estimate shall include sufficient documentation to facilitate replication.”
Eligible for consideration - that is fine, but it is not good to put everyone in one basket. “Consideration” does not mean that the compensation is decided.
It would be awesome for the public image of MAKER, if the 0-bid victims (not the self liquidated) would be compensated extraordinary. Because that is comparably easy to do. The 0-bid cases are actually also the only ones the media cares about. The self liquidators are just those, who sold at the bottom - that is normal market dynamics.
Actually i would say, that causality between damage and the technical problems of the MAKER protocol are obvious ONLY with the 0-bid victims. As long as the protocol did work fine - there is no causality whatsoever.
If the self liquidators - some call them as heroes and feel like paying them a bonus - feel misinformed by the user interface of the application they use to access the MAKER protocol, then they can put their claims to the provider of that user interface.
Not sure what the latest delay is. Something to do with the percentage values being incorrect and therefore meaning nothing.
I dont fully understand the problem to be fair, but it certainly seems as though all efforts are focused elsewhere and us that lost out just have to wait for the machine to fix its other issues first before they get round to swatting the particular fly…
Folks we’re still moving along, making some last preparations before we can put up the final poll - I expect we should be ready to go for next week or the following week, and will update everyone here once it’s on the schedule.
Monet-Supply, wanted to thank you and MakerMan (and anyone else involved in the weeds here) for bringing this kicking and bucking bronco along. One idea to note from someone who has followed this process and those involved in it. I hope that as part of granting any compensation, the DAO will bind recipients to a public statement that they will not participate in the ongoing class action or some individual litigation and that they will not attempt to double-dip in recovery against the Foundation. I’ve seen multiple handles here trying to drive claimants to the class action attorney and others who have made threatening (and I’d say hyperbolic and ill-informed ) statements. Regardless, these people should understand that attempting to double recover will be a challenging (if not morally and ethically conflicted and potentially embarrassing) road to travel and if they take money from us, the DAO, then they are barred from going hat in hand to the Foundation.